

KIBERA INTERGRATED WATER, SANITATION AND WASTE MANAGEMENT PROJECT POST- PROJECT INTERVENTION EVALUATION



Foreword and Acknowledgements

This report is part of a larger study of the impact of K-WATSAN and KENSUP in Soweto East. The report covers several aspects of the process and focuses on distilling lessons learned, best practices and prospects for scaling up. The core message that has so far emerged from the search is that

- some major successes have been achieved in Soweto East,
- these are above all due to the trust and collaboration that has emerged by honouring the principles articulated by the Government of Kenya and UN Habitat in early visioning for the work,
- the expertise and commitment of those working in the field on the projects has been instrumental in building and maintaining the trust and productive working relations,
- the ultimate impact in Soweto East will be determined by how the hard-won trust from the community is rewarded in the final outcome of the new housing, and, lastly,
- that, whether the final outcome is positive or negative, there are significant methodological positive outcomes that show promise for both replication and scaling up.

The evidence is that the challenges faced by those living in slums *can* be systematically and constructively addressed.

The cover pictures are intended simply to represent points along journey: the starting point; the road that has been taken, the practical outcomes that have been achieved, and the test that lies ahead.

It has been a pleasure to come to know the people who have contributed to this success – from people living in the community, to those who worked with implementing partners, to those with the principles, notably UN-Habitat and the Government of Kenya. It has been impressive to see their understanding and commitments to success. They cannot all be named here, but all are acknowledged, with great appreciation, for their willingness to assist in this study of outcomes and processes. They are also congratulated for what they have achieved in Soweto East.

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*Thom Meredith and Melanie MacDonald
Montreal and Toronto, March 2013*

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Introduction

Pressures leading to urban migration have exacerbated the problems of urban poverty and increased the need for low cost shelter. High density, poorly serviced, informal settlements – “slums” – have provided a useful refuge for the poor but are incompatible with norms of civic administration, public health, social equity, and environmental sustainability. Innovative approaches to reducing the challenges associated with slums are being sought, but the complexity and the scale of the task has meant slow progress.

The Kenya Slum Upgrading Programme (KENSUP), a collaboration between the Government of Kenya and UN-Habitat, has taken up the challenge. Their flagship project in the village of Soweto East, Kibera, Nairobi, is nearing completion. This project has proceeded to a stage at which a profound and exemplary success appears to be within grasp, but high expectations for success also bring new risks.

The Kibera Water and Sanitation Project (K-WATSAN) has operated as part of the KENSUP initiative and played a pivotal role in Kibera. Given the historic resistance to slum upgrading that has often merely displaced residents, the aim was to work with the community to address local needs, win the trust that would allow a successful intervention. The K-WATSAN initiative was envisioned as an integrated intervention that would provide an entry point for the larger KENSUP project by addressing key concerns identified in the participatory community assessments. Key targets were water and sanitation, drainage, waste collection, transport access, security and capacity building. Using an adaptive, community based, approach was central to the plan. Proponents hoped the initiative would be a “proof-of-concept” that would demonstrate that crucial improvements in quality of life are possible in large informal settlements. This report presents and assesses evidence of progress in relation to K-WATSAN in Soweto East. It addresses both the successes and the new risks.

Chapter 1 introduces the study; Chapter 2 gives background; Chapter 3 outlines the specific objectives, notably, exploring what was done, what the impact was, and what the implications

are; Chapter 4 describes the methods used in the study and Chapters 5 to 7 address each of the specific objectives. General conclusions follow in Chapter 8.

Two complementary overarching paradoxes provided a conceptual framework for the analysis.

The first addresses the functional social-ecology of informal settlements and notes that there are viable socio-ecological systems operating within slums that make them not only viable, but also the best available choice for at least some of the inhabitants. It is incumbent on project managers to know how the essential attributes can be protected or replaced. Three specific questions follow:

- How are human needs met within a slum and why are people drawn to them?
- If outside support is to be provided, what are the first and most important improvements that can be made, and how can they be made without damaging or limiting the socio-ecological systems that do work?
- What must be included when planning a low-cost housing programme to ensure that all of the beneficial elements of informal settlements are preserved and that, overall, the community remains viable?

The second overarching issue is the apparent paradox is that, by and large, *the global community does not accept extreme inequity as a necessary element of society but appears unwilling (or able) to modify the systems that create the inequity.* In terms of slum-upgrading the related questions are these:

- Can formal housing be made available at a cost accessible to those who inhabit slums?
- If not, can the income level of those living in slums be raised to meet the threshold level of affordability?
- If not, can the difference in cost be carried by a third party in some way that is sustainable? Sustainability is the key. As the World Bank 2013 report correctly notes: “finance is the difficult final part of the puzzle.”

Three core objectives in this study derive from these overarching concerns. They are:

1. To record elements of the K-WATSAN process including
 - project management aspects that have been central to outcomes
 - challenges that have emerged and responses to those challenges
- To document the impact of K-WATSAN and the KENSUP Programme in Soweto East to date
- To determine what can be learned from the success and challenges, based on
 - what critical actors claim to have learned from their own engagement
 - what is shown by the data and information collected for this study.

The study methods included identifying and contacting key stakeholders and actors, collecting and reviewing salient documents, and conducting in-field assessments through key informant interviews, focus group discussions, field surveys and participant observation.

Key Findings

Objective 1: Understanding the K-WATSAN project in Soweto East

The basic elements of the storyline of K-WATSAN events in Soweto East are extracted from Habitat and KENSUP documents, from project documents supplied by affiliated groups, and from key informant interviews.

The 1996 United Nations Conference on Human Settlements (Habitat II) “*challenged governments to use shelter development as a tool to break the vicious cycle of poverty, homelessness and unemployment*” (Syrjänen, Raakel, 2008). The Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), promulgated in 2000, established an international commitment to “*making major improvements in the lives of 100 million slum dwellers by the year 2020.*” Notably, the commitments were couched in a philosophy of partnership and democratization. This is an essential element of all that followed in the K-WATSAN program. The programme in Soweto East began with the Nairobi Situation Analysis (2001) and a Participatory Urban Appraisal (2004). The overall Soweto East programme included the temporary resettlement of residents to a housing complex just outside of Kibera (called the “decanting site”) while existing structures were demolished, land was cleared, and new structures, with new tenure arrangements, were

built. But these dramatic housing initiatives were to be embedded in wider interactions with the community. These were part of the K-WATSAN program.

The formal K-WATSAN proposal was drafted with a planned starting date of November 2005, revised to January 2006, and an expected completion date of 2008. The initial budget was for US\$ 579,684, and partners included the Government of Kenya (through KENSUP) and the NGO Maji na Ufanisi (Water and Development) as the implementing partner. Maji was selected because of its unique record of community mobilization in water and sanitation projects for slum areas.

Preparation for the K-WATSAN project included a community sensitization workshop on February 13-14, 2006, with the goal of building awareness of the project among stakeholders, as well as clarifying roles and responsibilities of those involved and/or impacted. The construction of an access road into Soweto East, an important development to complete other elements of the project, was the most conspicuous and ambitious aspect of the work and resulted in a revised completion date of May 30, 2010 and a budget increase to USD \$1,057,058.95.

The overall programme in Soweto East, naturally, did not advance without criticism and resistance despite public consultations and commitments to transparency. Amnesty International, for example, wrote recommendations to the GoK that included: developing “guidelines that comply with international law,” ensuring that “KENSUP consults affected community members,” and ensuring that “policies address immediate needs of residents in terms of security of tenure and access to essential services.” Likewise, structure owners mounted a legal challenge which eventually proved unsuccessful, but which led to an injunction that delayed work of clearance and new construction.

Objective 2: Project Impact

In the light of the posited objectives of the proponents and the general controversies associated with slum upgrading, the second objective of this study was to assess the impact of, and the local perception of, the K-WATSAN project. The study included surveys, interviews, and field observations. A total of 275 valid surveys were conducted amongst three groups: along the new


road (N=180), kiosk owners or workers (N=30) and sanitation blocks management committees (N=65).

The specific objectives of the survey were to:

- Understand the perceived change in quality of life arising from the construction of the access road into the slum.
- Identify reasons for the expressed change.
- Determine the level of engagement that respondents felt with respect to planning and project implementation.
- Collect demographic information about respondents
- Using a list of “impact variables,” determine perception of local conditions as they were before the start of the project, as they were at the time of the interviews, and as respondents expected them to be when all phases of KENSUP were completed.

Results presented in Chapter 6 show the following.

1. The interventions had a great effect and their impact was overwhelming seen as positive e.g. for the road itself over 75% reporting conditions as better or much better (Fig 6.2.2.)



2. Living conditions were, by and large, seen as being “very bad” before the interventions and much improved as a result of the interventions to the date of the surveys and, most significantly, it was clear that optimism about the future state of living conditions indicated good faith in the process and the proponents (e.g. Figs. 6.2.4. A,B, and C).
3. Despite the efforts at outreach, some communication challenges remained. In the general survey (the road survey) most people did not feel that they had been adequately consulted and that felt that the needs of the community were not well understood (Figs 6.2.5 to 7). By contrast, in the more restricted survey of members of sanitation block groups, members did feel that they were consulted and that the community’s needs were understood (Fig 6.3.5 to 7).
4. The kiosk survey added specific questions about the impact of the road on business and the kiosk owners view on Council kiosks that were being constructed for rent. Owners overwhelmingly found the road to be beneficial but had mixed feelings about the Council kiosks, with almost 50% saying that the kiosks would not be helpful to them (Fig. 6.4.3) and over 60% saying they would not want to rent one (Fig 6.4.4).
5. When asked about the hardest and the best things about living in Kibera (Section 6.5) respondents cited insecurity, sanitation, employment and poverty as being the four most difficult attributes (in that order), and affordability, community, simplicity and proximity as being the best. The top four citations for “most needed” changes to the community were sanitation, housing, security and healthcare.

Objective 3: Lessons Learned

The final objective was to determine what could be learned from the successes and failures of elements of the project. Chapter 7 addresses “lessons learned” as derived from project documents, interviews and survey results. Eight areas are considered:

- 1) Engagement: community involvement is challenging but essential.
- 2) Complexity: the systems embedded in an informal community are complex and so challenges (and surprises) must be factored into planning and mechanisms for adapting must be included in project management.
- 3) Difficulty of construction: infrastructure and engineering work is affected by many challenges not associated with work outside such a densely settled area.
- 4) Competing time demands: given the above, it is necessary that scheduling flexibility be maintained to ensure thorough responses following surprises and delays.
- 5) Sustainability: even when technical solutions are found, it is necessary to find ways to make them self-sustaining within the community.
- 6) Management: must be an adaptive or “learning” system.
- 7) Communication: given the complexity, the numbers of stakeholder groups, competing interests, and the importance of coordination, effective communication strategies must be embedded in project strategies.
- 8) Risks: given the record of failed slum-upgrading activities, it is necessary to be aware of the risks of creating unrealistic expectations or of failed promises.

Conclusions

In the Soweto East project, KENSUP and K-WATSAN have targeted the basic requests of the community as defined in the initial Participatory Urban Assessment. Survey results show that the project to date has improved lives and motivated and empowered the community. Proponents have earned trust and have built expectations by having successfully worked closely with the community. In relation to the cited overarching issues, proponents have identified and responded to local perceptions and aspirations in a way that recognizes and attempts to preserve the positive elements of life in the community. Likewise, proponents have built optimism by presenting a model for new housing which appears to offer a sustainable solution to the cost/affordability gap.

The subtitle of this report is “Progress and Promise”. There is no question that progress has been made in Soweto East and that the promise of a better future has been accepted by residents. The final section is subtitled “Promise and Peril.” Community trust is essential to progress, and the survey results show that in this case trust has been won. But if trust is won with promises that

are not met, or with conditions that lead to false, vague, or unrealistic expectations, the final local outcome may prove damaging, and the negative legacy for other projects may endure.

The final outcome the KENSUP programme in Soweto East depends entirely on the eventual answer to the question of whether lives of the original community members will have been improved at the end of the project. Regardless of the eventual outcome, however, there are valuable lessons to be drawn from the procedural successes achieved during the implementation of this project. The adaptive approach to working with the community has been successful and is replicable. Effort to scale-up must include mechanisms for community engagement and be based a local adaptive management approach. More specifically, K-WATSAN has shown how this process can begin successfully.

**Kibera Integrated Water Sanitation and
Waste Management Project**

Post-Project Intervention Assessment Report

Progress and Promise: Innovations in Slum Upgrading

1 PROGRESS AND PROMISE: INTRODUCTION TO THE STUDY

1.1 The changing landscape

One of the authors (TM) first travelled to Nairobi in 1972. Small scale slum clearance was underway, and earthmoving machinery was pitted against small cardboard and scrap wood shelters on the flood plain of the Nairobi River, immediately downriver of the Globe Cinema Roundabout. At the time, despite the local resistance and the obvious sense of human tragedy, it appeared that the general understanding was that slum clearance was not only right, but also necessary and inevitable. What was unclear were answers to questions of what administrators thought would happen to the people thus dislocated. Did they think they would move to other informal shelters in less conspicuous and therefore less objectionable locations? Did they think they would return to some sustainable rural homeland? Did they think they would move to better permanent housing in the city or suburbs? Did they think that they would simply vanish? Or, did they perhaps simply not think about it, accepting that the “solution” was self-evident and the consequences were immaterial?

Forty one years later we are at a remarkable juncture that may have profound implications, positive or negative, for dealing with the social challenge that was presaged in the 1972 clearance. Despite all that has changed since then – in economic modernization, better food production, greatly improved education and increased environmental awareness – human populations have grown, rural land has been stressed, and human expectations have changed so that populations are drawn inexorably towards cities. As a result, the problems of urban poverty and the provision of low cost shelter have increased. Slums¹ – high density, poorly serviced, informal settlements – are seen as being a part of the challenge of human progress, and innovative approaches to reducing crises associated with slums are being sought. The complexity and scale of the challenge has meant slow progress. This report deals with evidence of progress in Soweto East, Kibera.

¹ Throughout this report, the word “slum” is used consistently with UN usage, notably, for example, in *The Challenge of Slums: Global Report on Human Settlements*. UN-Habitat, 2003 (b), revised 2010.



Photo 1 The Challenge of Drainage. ²



Photo 2 Even with improved drainage, the challenges of erosion and contamination continue.

² All photos are by Thomas Meredith, unless otherwise indicated.

1.2 A framework for assessment: two defining issues

This study assesses the impact of a specific intervention as part of a slum upgrading program. The circumstances and the initiative are unique and must be treated as such, but the process is comparable to many other environmental management interventions: an effort is made to understand complex interactions within social and environmental systems with a view to improving both the state and the sustainability of the systems. Environmental management is characterised by change, complexity, uncertainty, and conflict (Mitchell, 2010). These attributes obtain here.

Justice Thomas R. Berger (1977) conducted a seminal study in environmental management for a proposed gas pipeline to follow the Mackenzie River to the Arctic Ocean in northern Canada. The report was entitled “*Northern Frontier, Northern Homeland.*” Its conclusion was dramatic – it stopped the development of a multi-million dollar oil project – and its core message was revolutionary: what may have seemed like a frozen wasteland and remote wilderness to energy entrepreneurs in remote southern cities was, in fact, “home” to people who knew, cherished and depended on the northern environment. Comparably, the UN-Habitat (2003b) report “*The Challenge of Slums: Global Report on Human Settlements*” talks of *slums of hope* and *slums of despair*. The transformation in policy addressing the challenge of slums has been based on a similar dichotomy: to those on the outside (policy advisors, government officials, etc.), slums may have been impenetrable, threatening blights of “squalor” on the urban landscape. To those living within, whether supporting people during a transition to a higher aspiration, or sheltering people who have lost hope, the slums have been, and are, *home*.

In the course of this study in Soweto East, it became apparent that two complementary overarching issues provided an essential conceptual framework of the analysis; one deals with the functionality of the informal settlements, and the other with the social and economic systems within which slums have emerged. These are considered below.

1.2.1 The functional socio-ecology of informal settlements

There are basic biophysical and social elements required for humans to survive. It can be concluded, therefore, that where humans do survive, *de facto*, these elements are met, even if in

rudimentary ways. That is, that within slums there are viable socio-ecological systems operating. Despite being characterized by material shortcomings, these systems make slums not only viable, but the best available choice for at least some of the inhabitants. Moreover, to the extent that slums are functionally integrated into many city landscapes, they are, *de facto*, shown at least to be compatible with, and may be supportive of, the functioning of those cities. When assessing the impacts of slum upgrading, the attributes of slum communities that account for their viability, vitality and even vibrancy must be considered. An effort must be made to understand how these attributes are generated, regulated and sustained. In an engineered and planned community transformation such as the Soweto East project, it is incumbent on project managers to know how the essential attributes can be protected or replaced; conditions must not be made worse. Three specific questions follow:

- How are human needs met within a slum and why are people drawn to them?
- If outside support is to be provided, what are the first and most important improvements that can be made, and how can they be made without damaging or limiting the socio-ecological systems that do work?
- What must be included when planning a low-cost housing programme to ensure that all of the beneficial elements of informal settlements are preserved and that, overall, the community remains viable?

As the record of failed low cost housing projects suggests, if community dynamics are not accounted for in the design, results can be disastrous. The final success of the project in Soweto East will depend on two factors: whether conditions are made better, and whether the original inhabitants, who were displaced by the project, will be the beneficiaries of improvements. If the answer is yes to both questions, it may prove to be a model of what is replicable. If conditions are worse, or if people are displaced, the project will have failed. Given the apparent good faith, due diligence and professional creativity and competence of the project team, a failure will show the enormity of the task that lies ahead.

1.2.2 The social commitment paradox

H.G. Wells described history as a “race between education and catastrophe” (Wells, 1920).

There are many challenges facing humanity – from climate change to pandemics – each

demanding solutions, and each competing for the scarce resources required to find solutions. Increasing urban poverty is one such problem. Inequity is an attribute of all societies – at least as indicated nationally by Gini Coefficients (CIA World FactBook, 2012). Moreover, inequity appears to be growing, even in liberal democracies founded on principles of equality. The practical reality is that, even while there is comfortable affluence elsewhere, many people in present day live with basic needs unmet. The paradox is that, by and large, *the global community does accept extreme inequity as a necessary element of society, but, likewise, the global community does not appear willing to modify the systems that create the inequity.* This paradox underpins initiatives such as the MDGs, where clear objectives are constrained by the social “willingness-to-pay” from limited resources. With respect to slums, the paradox is that the very conditions that relegate some people to slums – low incomes and high housing costs – are the obverse of conditions that generate prosperity others, notably for those who hire labour and/or profit from increasing real-estate value. In terms of slum-upgrading the related questions are these:

- Can formal housing be made available at a cost accessible to those who inhabit slums?
- If not, can the income level of those living in slums be raised to meet the threshold level of affordability?
- If not, can the difference in cost be carried by a third party in some way that is sustainable? Sustainability is the key: a programme cannot be effective if the financial means to sustain it are not forthcoming. As the World Bank 2013 report correctly notes: “finance is the difficult final part of the puzzle.”

The question that will determine the overall success the KENSUP Programme in Soweto East is whether or not a viable mechanism has been found to make formal, improved, housing financially accessible to those who previously could not (or would not) pay the market rate for formal housing. If not, and if the new structures in Soweto East become middle-class housing on land once available for the very poor (as the adjacent Nyayo Highrise Project arguably did), the project will likely be seen as having violated hard-won trust, and may have lasting negative effects on all efforts to improve living conditions in Kibera and elsewhere in Kenya, and perhaps beyond.

1.3 Perspective – conventional wisdom?

The existence of slums in Nairobi and other towns of Kenya is a matter of serious concern. During the past years, a fraction of slum dwellers have been moved out of their habitations as a result of the demolitions. There have also been attempts of slum upgrading (provision of services) but the same have only resulted in permanent slums. On the whole, the slum problem continues much as it was. Unless steps are taken to make it impossible for new slums to come into existence, the problem of slums will become even larger. For preventing the growth of slums there are three sets of measures to be taken. Demolish and enforced municipal by-laws with the utmost strictness and allow no substandard structure; Upgrading the slum; Redevelopment. Of the three, the last option always improves slum dwellers lives. To a large extent there is no alternative to their demolition and clearance, but there may be cases where measures for improvement are feasible. Hitherto proposals for slum clearance have been held back because of three difficulties, namely, the high cost of acquisition of slums (compensating landlords, formalizing tenure, etc.), the unwillingness of slum dwellers to move to distant places on account of the fear that their social and economic life will be dislocated, and most importantly, the need for subsidizing the construction of houses so that they can be let to slum dwellers at rates, which they can afford to pay. (emphasis added NHC, 2005).

This extended quote from a proposal for expansion of the Pumwani Housing Project in Nairobi sets out bluntly what may be “conventional wisdom” on slum upgrading: only three alternative exist for slums – to be cleared, upgraded or redeveloped. Furthermore, upgrading “results in permanent slums”; redevelopment “always improves slum dwellers’ lives”; fears of social and economic dislocation will generate resistance; and, lastly, if the project is to be sustainable, funds must be found to bridge the gap between available income and housing costs, be they rents or mortgages. These points reflect the overarching issues discussed above – the socio-ecological constraint and the social commitment paradox. And they may illustrate why, at least in 2005, the authors of the NHC report concluded: “*the slum problem continues much as it was.*”

1.4 Progress and Promise 1: UN-Habitat, Urbanization and the MDGs

UN-Habitat was created in 1978, and “struggled almost alone among multi-lateral organizations to prevent and ameliorate problems stemming from massive urban growth, especially among cities of the developing world.”³ The Millennium Development Goals, promulgated in 2000, presented clear challenges to the global community, and key links were drawn to urbanization. UN-Habitat produced a clear statement of key urban challenges in 2003 with the Global Report on Human Settlements. That report played a central role in setting the terms for the pilot project in Kibera, Nairobi, that is the subject of this study. Ten years later, as the first draft of this study was submitted, the World Bank’s Global Monitoring Report 2013 (GMR) was released (World Bank, 2013). This is an annual report on progress towards the MDGs and it typically selects a special focus for each report. The special focus of the GMR 2013 was the “Rural-Urban Dynamics and the Millennium Development Goals”. UN-Habitat no longer struggles alone!

The lead author of the GMR 2013 is quoted saying “*Urbanization is helping pull people out of poverty and advancing progress towards the MDGs, but, if not managed well, can also lead to burgeoning growth of slums, pollution, and crime.*”⁴

Key findings of GMR 2013 include:

- The increasing pace of urbanization – noting that now more than half of the global population is urban and that in the past two decades developing countries have urbanized rapidly.
- That urban areas are the engine of economic prosperity; 80% of the world’s wealth is produced by 50% of the population that is urban and that “*no country has graduated to a high-income status without urbanizing.*” (pg. 10)

³ From the UN-Habitat website: <http://www.unhabitat.org/content.asp?typeid=19&catid=10&cid=927> (Nov 20, 2013)

⁴ Quoted in Bank press release at <http://www.worldbank.org/en/news/feature/2013/04/16/urbanization-is-helping-power-people-out-of-extreme-poverty-and-assist-delivering-on-the-MDGs-says-report>

- That rates of poverty are lower and that basic services are easier to provide in cities.
- For these reasons, people are drawn from rural to urban areas.
- But “poverty in many countries is increasingly becoming an urban phenomenon.... Slums are the urban face of poverty and emerge when cities are unable to meet the demand for basic services and to supply the expected jobs.
- A likely 1 billion people live in urban slums in developing countries, and their numbers are projected to grow by nearly 500 million between now and 2020.
- Unregulated processes cannot meet the challenge of rapid urban growth and if “*higher costs must be fully internalized by firms and households, underinvestment is the result*” (pg. 13). Growth must be met with effective planning.
- Finance is “*the missing part of the puzzle*” (pg. 17).
- Slums are growing the fastest in Sub-Saharan Africa.
- Sub-Saharan Africa is the only region where all nine MDG targets are likely to be missed. Poverty reduction, reducing infant and maternal mortality and providing access to sanitation are cited as targets where progress has been slowest.

In essence, the GMR report demonstrates that urbanization is beneficial to a nation’s prosperity and that it is driven by factors that induce migration from rural to urban areas, but that the attendant negative consequences have not been, and are not likely to be, met by unregulated social and market mechanisms. Slums result. To meet the challenges of slums, systematic urban planning, and programs to provide basic services, are required. However, it is unclear how to finance solutions. These challenges are greatest in Sub-Saharan Africa, where no MDGs will be met, and those related to poverty, sanitation and health will continue to cause extreme hardship. Clearly, innovation is important.

1.5 Progress and Promise 2: KENSUP and K-WATSAN

The United Nations Human Settlements Programme (UN-Habitat) is based in Nairobi, Kenya. Nairobi is the largest city in, and economic centre of, a country that is itself a regional hub and

which draws immigrants from almost all its bordering countries. Nairobi is therefore a natural hub for innovation in addressing the challenges of slums. The Kenya Slum Upgrading Programme (KENSUP) – a collaboration between the Government of Kenya and UN-Habitat – has taken up the challenge. Their flagship project is in the village of Soweto East, Kibera, Nairobi, and is nearing completion. This enormous, costly, and extremely complex process has proceeded to where an exemplary success appears to be within sight, but being this close to success brings its own risks.

This study was undertaken to consolidate information specifically about one facet of the KENSUP Programme in Soweto East, which is, the Kibera Integrated Water Sanitation and Waste Management Project (K-WATSAN). The objective was to assess the strategy of using a multi-faceted approach to slum upgrading derived from a water and sanitation entry point for project engagement. In embarking on the programme in Soweto East, KENSUP adopted an innovative approach. Despite some initial distrust and resistance, some violence, some legal challenges, some failed experiments, and some (inevitable) professional and popular antagonism, the process has continued to the point at which people who had lived in the targeted slum are watching new buildings rise in the belief that these will be “home”, and people who have been directly affected by the multi-faceted K-WATSAN project can believe that the successes may be replicated. This report addresses the objective in three steps:

- To record elements of the K-WATSAN process including
 - project management aspects that have been central to outcomes, and
 - challenges that have emerged and what has been done to overcome them
- To document the impact of K-WATSAN and KENSUP - Soweto East to date
- To determine what can be learned from the success and challenges, which includes
 - what critical actors claim to have learned from their own engagement
 - what the authors of the study have concluded from the data and information they have collect through document assessments, field surveys, interviews and participatory research.

The study also addresses the possible implications of “surprise endings” – of sudden changes of trajectory that might lead to failed expectation. If the multi-faceted approach used by the K-WATSAN project has successfully won the trust of the community, but the final outcome proves not to meet the expectation that the trust has generated, then trust and cooperation will be harder to win in the future. The sub-title of this report, “Progress and Promise” indicates that progress on finding solutions to “the slum problem” does create promise and build expectations. The final section of this report addresses the risks that success implies.



Photo 3 The UN HABITAT suction device is used for evacuating pit latrines, but it cannot work where access is limited.



Photo 4 Access can be very difficult on existing roads and passages.

2 BACKGROUND TO THE STUDY

The terms of reference for this study were given as follows:

The rapid increase of urban populations in Africa is a catalyst for many problems and challenges. The consequent combination of urbanization of poverty, poor planning and constraints in local financial and institutional capabilities on the one hand, and pressures for development and competition for resources and livelihoods on the other, has combined to push life in African cities/towns virtually to the brink.

There is perhaps no area where the capacity to understand environments and manage change is more urgent and more challenging than in urban informal settlements, or slums. Poverty, social and economic exclusion, and the problem of housing so many new urban dwellers has resulted in the growth and spread of large informal settlements that are densely populated, poorly constructed, and lacking in almost all formal services. Historically ignored, hidden, undermined or, at best, merely tolerated, these areas are now seen to play an important role in the economy of states, in the cultural and social dynamics of nations, and in the ecology of expansive rural hinterlands. Ecologically, economically, socially, politically and culturally – not to mention ethically and morally – it is dangerous not to try to solve the challenges within slums.

With an estimated 60 percent of the population living in severely disadvantaged conditions, Nairobi city exemplifies the typical conditions found in majority of African cities. Kibera occupies over 250 hectares, 7 Km Southwest of the city of Nairobi, within the city boundaries. The population has been reported to be as high as “almost a million” while the 2009 census reports, controversially, just over 170,000 inhabitants (Daily Nation, Sept 3, 2010). There are many reasons why recording population density within an informal settlement is difficult. Kibera was originally traditional Masaai grazing land which was turned into a Kenya African Rifles (KAR) military reserve and, in 1945 at the end of WWII, was subsequently allocated as a temporary settlement to people of Nubian descent who had served as porters for the KAR during the period between 1912 and 1928. In 1992, the settlement was transferred to the local authorities. The settlement comprises of 12 villages: Lindi, Soweto East, Soweto West, Makina, Kianda, Mashimoni, Gatuikira, Kisumu Ndogo, Laini Saba, Silanga, Raila and Gichinjio.

The prevailing conditions in Kibera are precarious and the difficulty by government to cater for housing needs, implement an effective land policy, and provide a framework for pro-poor urban governance to ensure community participation and collective decision making (especially in the delivery of basic urban services) has further exacerbated these conditions. Added to these are the variety of everyday problems related to mobility where residents often commute long distances (on foot) because their homes are not easily accessible or served by affordable transport services. The lack of access into the community makes the provision of vital urban services (such as health, water and sanitation installations, solid waste collection and management etc.) difficult. UN-Habitat is the lead global agency working on transforming slums. In 2004, UN-Habitat and the Government of Kenya (GoK) set up the Kenya Slum Upgrading Programme (KENSUP), designed to improve the livelihoods of people living and working in informal settlements in the urban areas of Kenya through the provision of security of tenure and physical and social infrastructure, as well as opportunities for housing improvement and income generation. Currently implementation of KENSUP is ongoing in four Kenyan cities (e.g. Kisumu, Nairobi, Mavoko and Mombasa).

The Nairobi initiative of KENSUP is in Soweto East, one of the 12 villages of Kibera with an estimated population of 20,000 people (Research International, 2004). The K-WATSAN project has operated as part of the KENSUP initiative with the specific aim being to contribute to improving the livelihoods of the urban poor in Soweto East by supporting small-scale community based initiatives in water, sanitation and waste management. The initiative was intended to demonstrate that crucial improvements in life, quality and dignity are possible in such large informal settlements, and was designed to promote an in-built sense of project ownership in the targeted community for long term sustainability. It was felt that it was preferable to adopt an incremental approach whereby small-scale interventions are carried out to serve as a start to provide inspiration and reinforce daily life. This was the key role played by the K-WATSAN project.

K- WATSAN defined its objectives as follows.

- *Support community organization through the formation of WATSAN management committees to promote pro-poor community-based water, sanitation and solid waste management demonstration projects and capacity building including income generating activities.*
- *To develop Pro-poor governance framework through advocacy, awareness raising campaigns and pro-poor orientated governance structures, such as stakeholder consultations to empower and encourage community, NGO, private sector, governmental and donor partnerships*
- *To promote significant investments from all sources in supporting community based micro-enterprises to provide basic services, which are replicable and can be upgraded, for the improvement of the natural environment.*
- *Consider the adaptation of existing monitoring and evaluation tools to ensure equity, accountability and community empowerment in the processes of water and sanitation provision and community development as our contribution to the achievement of the MDG's for Soweto East village, Kibera*
- *To develop and implement a communication strategy for water, sanitation and solid waste management.*

These broad objectives were to be achieved through a series of specific interventions, outlined in the *UN-Habitat and the Kenya Slum Upgrading Programme Strategy* (Syrjänen, 2008)

The project is guided by the following specific objectives:

- *Improve water, sanitation and waste management conditions, through the provision of storm water drains, communal water and sanitation facilities, and small-scale door-to-door waste collection and recycling services;*
- *Improve the mobility within Soweto East, by constructing a low-volume road, taking into account the needs of non-motorised transportation users;*
- *Establish non-motorised transport as an alternative and efficient tool for creating income earning opportunities and providing low cost sustainable access to waste management services;*

- *Provide household power connections in conjunction with the Kenya Power and Lighting Company;*
- *Support the community to identify and venture into new income generating and business opportunities;*
- *Enhance information and technology skills among the population through the establishment of a Community Information and Communication Technology Centre; and*
- *Strengthen the institutional and technical capacities of selected key target groups by conducting training courses.*

The K-WATSAN project has been completed and the KENSUP Programme in Soweto East has reached a critical juncture. The process has generated significant learning for programmes aimed at improving the lives of urban poor in informal settlements. In order to inform future scaling-up and replication in similar situations, these lessons and challenges need to be consolidated and documented for wide dissemination.

3 OBJECTIVES OF THE STUDY

KENSUP and the K-WATSAN project have perhaps broken a mould that has previously excluded community members from slum upgrading efforts and from the dialogue on meeting basic human needs. The K-WATSAN project is important not simply because it has served to make part of one of Nairobi's most notorious slums more habitable, but much more because it may provide a model for further transformations in Kibera and elsewhere that will profoundly change the lives of citizens.

The immediate changes are being realized in the lives of those affected, but greater value will come in learning to extend, transfer and scale-up these efforts. This will require detailed information on 1) what was done, 2) what was the impact, and 3) how it can be made replicable. Providing this information is the major objective of the present research proposal.

3.1 Exploring what was done

The K-WATSAN project and the KENSUP Programme in Soweto East have both set ambitious goals that depended on innovative methods. Part of this study has been to explore the design and execution of procedures used and to note, from internal documents and interviews, what has worked as expected, what has produced better-than-expected results, and what has proven to be methodologically challenging. The impact of K-WATSAN will have been influenced by what preceded it and by how K-WATSAN was linked to other initiatives that proceeded simultaneously. Its final impact will be determined by what happens within the community following the cessation of K-WATSAN. Chapter 5 reviews documents collected through research to understand some of the contextual factors and some of the details of the K-WATSAN processes itself.



Photo 5 Building the road, and all other aspects of the K-WATSAN initiative, involved local using labourers. This gives the community a sense of ownership, and it may help protect resources, but it can also slow progress and lead to some challenges in maintaining engineering standards.



Photo 6 Manual work employs people from the community, but is slower and more difficult to plan and manage than a job done by a mechanical digger.

3.2 Exploring the impact

The intention of the K-WATSAN and the KENSUP Programme in Soweto East has been to successfully transform the habitability of the built environment of the slum while improving the lives of the residents. To gauge this, we have conducted field surveys and interviews with those affected. While there are some problems associated with using self-reported subjective measures of success and impact (e.g. how people believe community health has changed, as opposed to actual records of disease burden; or how they believe community safety has changed, as opposed to actual crime or assault records), it is, ultimately, the community sense of well-being that should be improved through planned interventions, and so these self-reported indices are taken as valid and important. These results are reviewed in Chapter 6.

3.3 Exploring the implications

Success on the ground in one community is vitally important to that community and is a valid objective in its own right. But given the scope and scale of the challenges of urban poverty and inadequate shelter, a major goal of innovation has to be to help define options for replication and scaling-up. This requires assessment of the “lessons learned” regarding best practices. Based on the record of activity of K-WATSAN, and on its impact, Chapter 7 includes a compilation of “lessons learned” that were noted by project managers while doing the work and are recorded in project documents. Chapter 8 concludes the report with additional observations on best practices based on the results of surveys, interviews and experience in the field and considers the implications of K-WATSAN for replication and scaling-up.

4 METHODS

4.1 Procedures

The study used an approach based on a conceptual three-dimensional matrix that defined units of study. The dimensions were project elements, actors and stakeholders, and phase of the development (Table 4.1).

1. Project elements	2. Actors and Stakeholders	3. Phases of Development
<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. The construction of sanitation blocks and the implementation of community-based management 2. Improvement of drainage 3. Improvement of access, including the construction of an access road 4. Construction of a community resource centre 5. Land consolidation for each of the above 6. Community mobilization for each of the above 	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. UN-Habitat 2. Government of Kenya 3. Nairobi City Council 4. Implementing partner (Maji na Ufanisi) 5. The Settlement Executive Committee (SEC) 6. CBOs 7. NGOs 8. Informal groups identified by common interest 9. Leadership groups in adjacent areas 10. Leadership groups in other Nairobi slums 	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Conceptualization 2. Planning 3. Consultation and advocacy 4. Field preparations 5. Implementation 6. Operation 7. Monitoring 8. Post-project evaluation feedback, adaptation and sustainability

For each cell or groups of cells in the matrix, the following procedures were adopted

1. Scoping: Preliminary assessment of value of data pertaining to each cell (in consultation with research partners, notably UN-Habitat).
2. Key contacts: individuals were identified and preliminary contacts were made.
3. Document search: formal and informal records of key events were identified and, where possible, collected for examination.
4. Preliminary evaluation and field study design: based on initial data, plans were developed for:
 - a. Key interviews
 - b. Systematic surveys (quantitative and qualitative field questionnaires)

- c. Field observations (identification of key indicators and collection of data on these)

The specific methods used for the facets of the study covered and further developed in Chapters 6 through 8.

5 WHAT WAS DONE WITHIN THE KENSUP PROGRAMME IN SOWETO EAST?

5.1 Literature Review

5.1.1 Introduction

In 2001, the United Nations Human Settlements Programme (UN-Habitat) revealed that 924,000,000 people in the world were living in slums and estimates suggest this figure will rise to 1.5 billion by 2020 (Payne, 2005). Such rapid growth has serious repercussions for a population's access to basic needs that ensure health and human rights are possible, such as access to safe water and affordable housing (Dagdeviren & Robertson, 2011).

The following literature review will provide a brief historical account of the connection between housing policy and 'slum development' and its shifting approach – from demolition, to redevelopment, to upgrading – in the city of Nairobi. The aim of this literature review is to provide a background to contextualize and assess what has transpired in Soweto East. Context

According to many, Kenya's capital city, Nairobi, “hosts some of the most dense, unsanitary and insecure slums in the world” (Syagga, Mitullah & Gitau, 2001: 1). Founded in 1899, its population accelerated significantly throughout the 20th century; most notably, over the last five decades its increase was tenfold – from a quarter of a million people in the year of independence (1963) to 3.1 million people in 2009 (Ottichilo, 2011: 167). With this rise in people came the expansion of the city's boundaries. According to UNDP (1997), Nairobi covered an area of 18 square kilometers in 1906 and by 1927 it had grown to approximately 690 square kilometers.

Today, majority of the city's population are 'slum dwellers' with an estimated 60 percent of the city's official total population of 3.1 million people living in informal settlements (Nairobi, 2001). With an annual growth rate of 5 percent, the municipality will host 5 million people by the year 2020, of which nearly 3 million will live in the precarious conditions that define slum communities (ibid.). As such, an effective, sustainable city planning strategy is crucial as population and migration increase, and globalization brings more complexities to city building.

5.1.2 Slums In Nairobi

Characterised by “overcrowding, poor or informal housing, inadequate access to safe water and sanitation, and insecurity of tenure,” the prevailing conditions in Nairobi’s slums are precarious to say the least (Davis, 2006: 23). According to both Kefa Otiso (2003) and Aduwo Obudho (1997), slums have proliferated in urban Kenya in recent decades for a number of reasons; (1) widespread poverty, (2) over-urbanization due to rapid population growth, (3) shortages of decent, low-income housing resulting from inappropriate urban planning policies and building standards, (4) inequitable patterns of landownership, (5) shortages of serviced land, exorbitant urban land prices, and an absence of tenure for the urban poor, (6) poor enforcement of building and zoning laws, and (7) limited housing finance. Kibera is a community that demonstrates each of these points.

5.1.3 Policy Response To Slums/Informal Settlements

Understanding the specific historical and political background of Kenya and the relationship between housing and slum upgrading initiatives in the City of Nairobi is tantamount to understanding the shifting approach to slum development in general. The fact that Kenya’s colonial experience was that of a settler state significantly influenced the planning and building of the city in the 20th and 21st centuries. Europeans established both a white agricultural export economy and administration, taking land from Kenyans, prohibiting them from growing cash crops of their own and, simultaneously, labeling them *only* as potential labourers for their agricultural sector (Amiss, 1988: 237). The City of Nairobi was developed as the service centre of this economy, with its location chosen as a convenient stopping spot for the Ugandan Railway. It also was where the first pass-law system was established in order to further restrict the activities and migration of Kenyans (particularly rural to urban), and was systematically racially zoned in major plans starting as early as 1905, again in 1927, and then 21 years later in 1948 (Amiss, 1988; Ottichilo, 2011). The main aim of this zoning was directly connected to the Public Health Act of 1930 to “achieve a disease-free urban environment with a minimum of public expenditure” – a major justification for slum clearance carried on throughout the century, though with varying verbiage (Amiss, 1988: 237; Macharia, 1992: 226).

As a result of this experience with externally forced interdiction and zoning, Kenya’s policy and legislative environment has historically been extremely fragmented. Throughout the 1960s,

1970s, and 1980s, for example, strategies ranged from demolishing communities considered to be slums, to redeveloping these same areas. The first official housing policy – Sessional Paper No. 5 – was designed in 1966/67, post-independence, and was the first of its kind to emphasize the need for subsidized public housing with the long-term goal of ensuring every house-hold had access to a ‘decent home’ (Langford, du Plessis, & Stuart, 2006: 35; Macharia, 1992: 225; Nabutola, 2004: 11; Okonkwo, 1998: 14; Omenya & Huchzermeyer, 2006: 295). Programmes that followed this housing policy mirrored those from pre-independence, however, which meant that they continued to use the policy as explanation (or justification) for the demolition of existing informal settlements in the city (Okonkwo, 1998; Langford, du Plessis, & Stuart, 2006: 35). Demolitions and Redevelopment Projects often took place at the same time. The original housing policy called for both, yet somehow they developed as separate strategies. The reviewed literature for this report does not offer a clear explanation about this distinction and reveals that slum upgrading can or has often been confused with redevelopment.

Jomo Kenyatta, the first president post-independence, is cited to have had very little patience with or tolerance of the slums that developed in colonial Nairobi (Macharia, 1992: 228). With increasing rural-to-urban migration (namely due to a lift on the zoning restrictions implemented in colonial years), slums proliferated in the first years of his presidency and became more and more crowded. Making efforts to prove ‘law and order’ could be maintained in their increasingly overcrowded capital, Kenyatta and his government were worried about the city’s “eye sores” (ie. slums) and how the international community would view Nairobi. As a result, they resorted back to the initial colonial policy of slum demolition, providing official justification through the Public Health Act of 1930 (ibid).

After Kenyatta died in 1978, President Moi and his government continued to rely on the ‘independence constitution’, which contained outdated governance structures and was weak on citizen rights – it did not incorporate a ‘right to housing’, for example. President Moi resisted all demands to devise a new constitutional order, creating the conditions for continued uncoordinated slum initiatives (Omenya & Huchzermeyer, 2006). A number of slum clearances during his rule echoed the pre-independence demolitions. Just as the zoning had been justified, prescriptions from the Public Health Act were, again, used to defend these redevelopment

initiatives. Urban planning during those years was generally regarded as “regulatory, interventionist and controlling” as a result (ibid). An acceptable urban housing unit had to be built with specific materials and was defined as having at least two rooms, a kitchen and toilet, and a maximum of five occupants; a vision for how to ensure this was made possible and affordable for the people that lived in the communities that were demolished was not in place.

The National Housing Policy was not revised until May 2004, 37 years later, in Sessional Paper No. 3 and contained similar intentions to address deteriorating housing conditions and the shortage in housing (arising from demand that far surpassed supply), particularly in urban areas (Nabutola, 2004: 12). Around the same time, the *term* slum upgrading began to be used by UN-Habitat in relation to its commitment to the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs). The term historically was synonymous with ‘redevelopment’ strategies and, while they are different approaches today, this difference did not become explicit until UN-Habitat was created in 2002.



Photo 7 Resourcefulness in using every available ecology opportunity is widespread in Kibera, but the implications for health and food security are obvious.

5.1.4 Rationales

A review of the literature demonstrates that the rationale for developing the first housing policy and connecting it to both the Public Health Act and various slum development initiatives in Nairobi was done in response to a number of pertinent issues taking place at the time. The following points also draw insight for why policies remained unchanged until the beginning of the 21st century. Firstly, as explained above, the post-independence period for Nairobi was a challenging time of transition where governments attempted to transform policies (perhaps weakly) inherited from the ‘settler state’. As some scholars have suggested, without a clear blueprint for doing so, and with so many other problems to address in the city, effective housing strategies for an increasing urban population fell short – the scale of ‘need’ being too large for new governments to withstand. Secondly, increased poverty and inequality in the 1980s, largely a result of Structural Adjustment Programs (SAPs) imposed on the country by the Bretton Woods Institutes, further exacerbated the situation in slums – SAPs requiring the State to withdraw from service provision and government subsidies (Otiso, 2003). Acquiring significant deficit as a result inevitably caused the knee-jerk reaction to simply remove (or, rather, demolish) unplanned and uncontrollable informal settlements and slums. Thirdly, Nairobi City grew to be the home of many international organizations and NGOs during this period and, as such, Western notions of adequate housing and universal human rights became more commonplace. Gradually, the pressure(s) from external organizations and human rights groups helped push the outdated policies to the attention of the international community, and shifted the language and implementation from demolition and redevelopment to ‘upgrading’. In particular, important projects that took place in Kibera caused an investigative eye to the detail of housing policies in the country and slum ‘upgrading’ initiatives that were developing (with various terminology) along side them (see Nyayo Highrise Project).

5.1.5 Strengths & Challenges Of Slum Upgrading

There are many reasons why slums are a serious problem. In the city of Nairobi, the characteristics of these areas, as mentioned, have resulted in serious insecurity for residents. A lack of public services to communities, where waste and sewage are not managed properly, has led to poor sanitation and disease and, in many (unnecessary) cases, death. Fires pose a very real problem for communities where wide roads for vehicles simply do not exist. An increasing

population inevitably puts pressure on all of the issues at play. That said, there are many reasons why slum upgrading initiatives were needed in the late 20th century. The act of recognizing slum dwellers as contributing citizens in Kenya, and committing to policies that will better house these populations is a strength in and of itself.

The phases that Nairobi has experienced with policies for housing and slum development can be categorized as those of demolition, redevelopment, and upgrading. Demolition can be seen as a policy response to real (or perceived) problems (see the Pumwani Upgrading Project, the Mathare 4A Slum Upgrading Project, and the Nyayo Highrise Project as examples highlighted in Section 8.2.2), but a balance between demolition and preservation is critical to preserving viable neighbourhoods and sustaining the vitality of communities (Mallach, 2011). In contrast to traditional housing improvement strategies that focus primarily on legalizing the land tenure of residents, slum development is a much more complex strategy. The literature has demonstrated that if slum development is not done in partnership with the residents of communities themselves, then success of the projects has usually fallen short. Slum upgrading, defined by literature explored, is a combination of demolition and redevelopment schemes, but with the needed participatory aspect to planning that demolition/redevelopment did not historically use.

A challenge identified from the literature is the effects of international housing standards, which have sometimes been an imposition for effective planning strategies in slum upgrading. Aduwo Obudho (1989: 24), for example, notes that these standards often include specific things, such as: running-water in each household; a specific understanding/model of sanitation; and specific materials deemed most ‘durable’ for construction. It is not that these are ‘bad’ standards, but what is “decent” and “good” for one community is not always suitable for another. International guidelines that institute a normative understanding about housing may not always be appropriate. As Obudho says: “Some of these international standards are now very high, and construction costs almost insurmountable.” Affordable materials that are available and well suited to the climate is an important guiding principle in effective slum upgrading; what is easiest to implement is not always best.

Also a significant weakness in an examination of the literature was a preoccupation with the language of slum development. In addition to the reasons Obudho (1997) and Otiso (2003) list

for slums persisting in Nairobi, the time spent on what a slum actually *is* has resulted in vast amount valuable energy lost on the part of those working on the ‘problem’. A number of authors denounce the use of the term ‘slum’ as pejorative, focusing namely on the idea that the term is emotive. In using it, critiques say, the creation of ‘interdictory space’ and discriminatory policy is the result (Gilbert, 2007; Flusty, 2001). Had policies and projects in the 20th century had a definition of the ‘problem’ – as UN-Habitat has recently attempted (in 2008) – perhaps projects at that time would have been more effective and just.



Photo 9 Making materials for the project on site employs and trains locals, but may slow progress and possibly make quality control more difficult.

5.1.6 Lessons & Questions from the Literature

“Slums and poverty are closely related and mutually reinforcing, but the relationship is not always direct or simple.” (UN-Habitat, 2003: xxvi)

Housing and infrastructure delivery – slum development – must be regarded as being part of broader integrated development interventions aimed at social and economic development. Urban poverty is complex and multi-dimensional, and “single sector interventions cannot sustainably improve the shelter conditions of urban poor households” (Majale, 2003: 7). Additionally, the literature demonstrates that listening to the ideas, desires and needs of people living and working in slums is an important aspect of slum upgrading and effective housing policies in the city. There are many examples of projects that have been implemented in Nairobi where this was not the focus. As a result, examples of sustainable/successful slum upgrading projects have been difficult to find. An examination of the more recent literature and programmes, like K-WATSAN and KENSUP certainly suggests that the negative outcomes from past efforts are influencing more participatory planning processes. However, because this shift has happened only in the last five years, approximately, the outcomes of urban planning that operationalize ‘slum upgrading’ as it is defined by UN-Habitat have not yet been evaluated. The hope is that the lessons learned from colonial policies and the difficult post-independence transition period will result in more affordable housing for people living in slum communities in the city of Nairobi. *How* this can be effectively done remains as a central question. Therefore, a review of the literature demonstrates the importance of impact assessments, such as this report.

5.2 Document Search and Interviews

In order to understand the role and impact of K-WATSAN, it is necessary to situate it spatially, temporally, and institutionally. It functioned within a complex “ecosystem” of activity and its role and impact will have been influenced, and to some extent determined, by what preceded and what followed, and also by the institutional and operational dimensions of activities that K-WATSAN was linked to, a part of, or affected by. This section provides information about the context of the project. .

5.2.1 Objectives

The specific objectives of this section are to

- Describe factors leading up to the initiation of K-WATSAN
- Situate K-WATSAN within the KENSUP Programme in Soweto East
- Identify institutional linkages and partner activities as they affect K-WATSAN
- Consider ongoing activities in KENSUP and Kibera that will affect the ultimate legacy of K-WATSAN

5.2.2 Methods

Documents collected were reviewed for information that outlines the “storyline” of K-WATSAN and KENSUP and that defines the institutional arrangements and project interactions. Four categories of information are summarized below – the genesis of KENSUP; the selection of Soweto East as a pilot project area; the background to and operation of K-WATSAN; and the follow-up to the K-WATSAN project in Kibera.

5.2.2.1 Chronology and interdependent events.)

Extracts were taken directly from inventoried documents and significant dates were identified. Dates are entered in the table, in most cases with the exact text from the document, or, in some cases, with a comment made about the document. Because the collection of documents itself was not exhaustive, the chronology is intended as a reference tool rather than as a definitive summary of events. Because of the length of the table it is not included in the report, but pertinent information has been used in the following discussion..

5.2.2.2 Key informant interviews

Methods: We contacted key individuals and partner groups in government, other UN agencies, NGOs and CBOs involved in the project to arrange key informant interviews (Table 5.1). These include interviews with representatives from

- UN Habitat
- Maji na Ufanisi
- KENSUP
- Nairobi City Council
- Members of the Settlement Executive Committee (SEC)
- Members of the community, including members of CBOs

- Eco-Build Africa Trust
Soweto East Resource Centre

Table 5.1 Matrix of Interviews	
Type	Date
UN-Habitat	May 30, 2012
UN-Habitat	June 5, 2012
COMMUNITY GROUP MEMBER	June 11, 2012
COMMUNITY GROUP MEMBER	June 12, 2012
CITY COUNCIL EMPLOYEE	June 16, 2012
COMMUNITY GROUP MEMBER	June 18, 2012
CITY COUNCIL EMPLOYEE	June 19, 2012
COMMUNITY GROUP MEMBER	June 19, 2012
COMMUNITY GROUP MEMBER	June 19, 2012
UN-Habitat	June 21, 2012
UN-Habitat	June 21, 2012
MIN OF HOUSING, UN-Habitat – Focus Group	June 25, 2012
COMMUNITY GROUP MEMBER	June 27, 2012
COMMUNITY GROUP – Focus Group	June 29, 2012
NGO	July 3, 2012
NGO	July 4, 2012
ACADEMIC	July 5, 2012
MINISTRY OF HOUSING	July 5, 2012
MINISTRY OF HOUSING	July 11, 2012
MINISTRY OF HOUSING	July 18, 2012
MINISTRY OF HOUSING	July 18, 2012
MINISTRY OF HOUSING	July 27, 2012

5.3 Findings: The KENSUP Storyline

UN Habitat documents contextualize the processes leading to KENSUP with references to the 1996 United Nations Conference on Human Settlements (Habitat II) which “*challenged governments to use shelter development as a tool to break the vicious cycle of poverty, homelessness and unemployment*” (Syrjänen, Raakel, 2008). The Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), promulgated in 2000, established an international commitment to “*making major improvements in the lives of 100 million slum dwellers by the year 2020.*” (Source?) Notably, the commitments were couched in a philosophy of partnership and democratization. This is an essential element of all that followed in the K-WATSAN program. In 2000, there was a meeting between the then President of Kenya and the Executive Director of UN-Habitat which led to an

agreement that saw the creation of the Kenya Slum Upgrading Programme in 2001 (KENSUP, 2004). On January 30, 2001, the Joint Project Planning Team (JPPT) was formed, consisting of eight members, whose mandate was “to undertake an aggressive consultative process with stakeholders” including non-governmental organizations, community based organizations, key government sectors, the local authority and City Council as well as representatives from the private sector bodies and from development partners (MSSG, 2010). The Government of Kenya and UN-Habitat signed a memorandum of understanding on 15th January 2003 to collaborate in the formulation and implementation of a Kenya National Slum Upgrading Programme (KENSUP). KENSUP was formally launched on World Habitat Day, 4 October 2004 (PUA, 2004).

Slum upgrading in Kenya has a long history and various programs had been initiated but without demonstrable or replicable success. Conspicuous projects included the Pumwani-Majengo Project, initiated in 1983 (which displaced local people) (NHC, 2004), the Kibera High Rise Project (also known as Nyayo Highrise), a project in the 1990 (which displaced local residents), and the Mathare 4A project which had been started in March 1997 and was planned to end in December 2001, but which ran into significant difficulties arising from alienating local people. (Kmau and Ngari, 2002, Otiso, Kefa M., 2003). These projects had, if nothing else, demonstrated the complexity of slum upgrading and the potential for alienating the target communities. They also created natural suspicion and mistrust amongst residents of informal settlements. The predisposition was to resist slum upgrading initiatives proposed by outsiders. Against this background, the KENSUP recognized that a new approach was needed and articulated its overall goals as follows

to improve the livelihoods of people living and working in slums and informal settlements in the urban areas of Kenya through housing improvement, income generation, and the provision of security of tenure and physical and social infrastructure. Promote and facilitate broad-based partnerships utilising consensus building and consultation among all the stakeholders. Build institutional and human resource capacities at local and national levels for the sustainability of slum upgrading interventions. Facilitate the

implementation of innovative and replicable pro-poor slum-upgrading models through pilot projects, delivery strategies, and approaches. Assist the Government of Kenya in the development of financial strategies and the mobilisation of funds for slum upgrading. Undertake collection and dissemination of information for the promotion of sustainable slum upgrading practices and the provision of linkages to global best practices . (KENSUP, 2004).

This focus on “global best practices” complements the concern for built environment – notably shelter – with a concern for the community, that is, the citizens inhabiting the shelter. KENSUP was premised on a commitment to break away from a top-down approach to slum upgrading and to promote decentralization or “delegated decision-making” or decision making structures which encourage those most directly affected by the outcomes of decisions to be actively engaged in and, where possible, to be responsible for those decisions. The guiding principles (Table 5.2a) can be grouped by those that focus on the community, and those that focus on the built environment and infrastructure. The fact that eight of the principles refer to community attributes, while only two allude to infrastructure, suggests a clear recognition of the need to approach slum upgrading through an informed, engaged, motivated and supportive community. These high ideals are further emphasized in the assertion that

“slum upgrading is a social programme requiring broader and well-coordinated participation of all stakeholders. For this to be achieved a social scenario is desirable that offers an enhanced democratic space for citizen participation, capacity building and enabling environment for participation and engagement, sufficient and clear communication linkages and strategies.”

The development approach adopted under KENSUP is outlined in Table 5.2b.

Table 5.2a Guiding Principles abridged from “Kenya Slum Upgrading Strategy”
<p>Focus on the community</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Inclusive participation – the participation of community members in slum upgrading is their basic right, as they must have a say in the urban processes that shape their lives.

The ultimate goals are empowerment, capacity building, and sustainability.

- **Capacity building** for (a) the local communities; (b) the local authorities; (c) the central government slum upgrading processes.
- **Subsidiarity** – focusing decision making on the lowest appropriate level.
- **Partnerships** among all the key urban stakeholders.
- **Communication** UN-Habitat ensures the constructive exchange of ideas and information within the organization and promotes efficient and effective communication with partners.
- **Good governance** – characterised by participation, consensus, accountability, transparency, responsiveness, effectiveness, efficiency, equitability and inclusiveness.
- **Gender awareness** – permeate all programme activity and not be dealt with as a separate “women’s category”.
- **Affordable Housing Finance:** Most of the urban poor are excluded from access to conventional housing finance; UN-Habitat recognises that there are several advantages to saving communally:

Focus on the built environment

- **Sustainability** -- should start at the neighbourhood level (and) ... ensure that poverty-reduction activities are integrated with shelter programmes.
- **Provision of basic infrastructure as an entry point to slum upgrading.**

Table 5.2b The development approach outlined in the Kenya Slum Upgrading Strategy

1. Participatory preparation of settlement strategic development plan showing the following:
 - Existing structures, services and infrastructure
 - Proposed services and infrastructure (access roads, water, security and street lighting, health centers, schools, play grounds, sewer lines, markets, jua kali sheds etc).
2. Tenure regularisation
3. Installation of key infrastructure and services for whole settlement
4. Shelter development
 - Preparation of socio-economic profile

- Cluster/neighbourhood identification
- Organizing and mobilizing communities including formation of cooperatives
- Engagement of communities living in certain neighbourhoods to agree on the nature of development which is affordable
- Relocation and compensation
- Housing construction
 - Sourcing of finance (from private sector, government, civil society, IDAs)
 - Partnerships
- Housing allocation
- Post construction estates and facilities management and maintenance

5.3.1 Initiatives arising from the commitment to KENSUP

The commitments to KENSUP led to various initiatives supportive of the application of best practices in slum upgrading. These include the Nairobi Situation Analysis, the Participatory Urban Assessment, and the formation of the Multi Stakeholder Support Group. Each is discussed below.

5.3.1.1 Nairobi Situation Analysis – June 2001

This is a professional review document (Syagga *et al*, 2001) that

describes the present state of slums and slum upgrading initiatives in Nairobi. Its purpose is to serve as a discussion piece for diverse stakeholders to arrive at a consensus about the conditions of slums and the conditions governing slum upgrading. It provides an assessment of the political, social, physical, economic, cultural and institutional factors impacting on informal settlements. It adopts a critical perspective of the previous efforts by various development partners (government, international agencies, NGOs, Churches, CBOs, etc) to improve the conditions of people who live and work in informal settlements". The document notes the record of slum upgrading initiatives in which

“elites and experts normally make the major decisions regarding what is desirable and community participation is normally seen as a means of legitimising what has already been decided upon” (pg vii). They go on to emphasize that “Evidence shows, however, that upgrading of the living environment of low-income households can be done at substantially improved and relatively modest per capita cost through the provision of basic infrastructure. At the same time, given the right kind of encouragement, slum dwellers are capable of organising themselves and improving their standards of living. The Nairobi Situation Analysis concludes that in order to provide back up for the efforts of the poor, key stakeholder groups have to be involved in the development of infrastructure and service provision. (Syagga et al. 2001. p ix)

5.3.1.2 Participatory Urban Appraisal - 2004

This was an initiative to survey each of 12 villages in Kibera with two objectives:

1. To establish the real and actual situation of the living conditions of the people living and working in Kibera; 2. To use interactive community-based research methodologies for mobilization of the people to develop their hopes, generate their interest and secure their commitment in bringing about the necessary and desired change (without raising unrealistic expectations)”

A total of 153 residents of Soweto East participated in the appraisal, and 29 participated in the Stakeholders workshop. Because this study is so important for understanding the background to the Soweto East initiative, several key findings of the report are summarized in the tables below (Tables 5.3-5.8), including: objectives, a history of the community, positive attributes of life in the community, development goals, priority problems and needs and, lastly, recommendations from the PUA (GoK/KENSUP/UNH, 2004).

Table 5.3 The main objectives of the PUA in Soweto East

- To understand the lives of people living and working in Kibera in a holistic manner.
- To fully understand the aspirations and expectations of people of Kibera, so as to be able to determine what they consider to be a satisfactory and acceptable standard of living and

to understand what their life priorities are and what changes they would like to see in their lives in the future.

- To understand and prioritize needs as seen by the people themselves, in ANY area of their lives in the settlement.
- To determine issues relating to various aspects of each person's life, looking at
 - Habits in solving problems
 - Achievements
 - Attitude
 - Problems faced
 - Solutions possible in the areas of
 - Health including HIV/AIDS
 - Security
 - People's livelihood/income
 - Quality of the shelters/land tenure system
 - Education
- Understanding the economic status of people and various groups within Kibera, and how they achieve this economic status.
- Understanding the types of businesses that are operated within the settlement, and their impact on livelihoods, highlighting successful cases, understanding the secrets and replicability of this success, identifying barriers that businesses face, and how to solve these problems.
- To determine the demographic and family profile of residents of Kibera in terms of family types and sizes, life stage, gender, age and socio-economic status.
- To identify the key social networks and factors at play in Kibera, and in particular the way that Social Capital is gained and works. This is especially important so that any future activities can both build on and avoid destroying the structures in place which include ethnic groups, family friends, business contacts, associates, religious group membership, etc.
- To identify and understand factors that destroys social capital.
- To explore needs in the areas of infrastructure, (roads, sanitation, electricity, water).

Table 5.4 A History of Soweto East as presented during the PUA in 2004

1978:

- People were evicted from Stephen's place and relocated to Soweto East due to floods by then District Officer by the name Wachuka Ikua.
- The most prominent village elders were Mr. John Mwashu who was elected in the 1980's to be the leader. Since then no election has been held. John Mwashu helped other villagers to become village elders or even Assistant Chiefs outside Soweto East village.

1983:

- People were supplied with yellow maize due to starvation (Stephen provided the maize)
- The name Soweto East was also created that year due to many problems in the Soweto East area. One problem was destruction of houses by Government officials. This was because most structures were put up without the DO.'s knowledge. The people compared this situation to that of Soweto in South Africa and hence adapted the name Soweto.

1988:

- Rebuilding of Soweto East after the destruction by the police.
- KRA demolished houses along the railway line to create space for a railway line.
- The Soweto East people demonstrated at the City Hall due to the demolition and were granted permission to build the houses again but not close to the railway lines
- High-rise NHC estate was constructed, funds were collected from Soweto East residents but instead, the houses were given to non-residents of Soweto East.

1992:

- The road accessing Soweto East from Mbagathi Road was constructed manually by Soweto East residents. They built houses in the remaining space in the village.
- Retrenchment made people buy plots and renovate their structures using retrenchment money.
- Muungano wa Wana Vijiji with 50 members was started as a CBO.
- Building of bridges was started; they were built using wood, e.g. Riverside Bridge
- Building of stalls for business purposes was also started.
- Soweto East Women Group was started with the aim of cleaning the drainage, latrines, and training traditional birth attendants.
- People died of diarrhea, and several people were admitted in hospitals.

- The community started initiating their own water projects, i.e. electricity installation projects.
- 1998:
- Muiguithania Self Help Group was started with 30 members.
 - Kibera Disabled group was started with 60 members with the aim of supporting the disabled persons in the community.
 - The road from Mbagathi to Highrise was opened and constructed by residents.
 - Kisosi group was started with 25 members.
 - There was a fire outbreak, people lost most of their property and Highrise estate wall was demolished.
 - Undugu Society of Kenya built a bridge linking Soweto and other villages.
- 2003:
- Soweto East Highrise Self Help Group with 25 members was started
 - Maji na Ufanisi, started building latrines and drainage and cleaning the drains.

Table 5.5: Positive aspects of life in Soweto East. Authors of the PUA note that “*Residents must not lose what they are currently enjoying*” (2004: 3)

The community first identified the positive aspects about the village, which are:

- There are many small-scale business opportunities
- Affordable rents
- Availability of primary and secondary education
- Adequate water supply
- Security

The other positive aspects about Soweto East village are:

- There are cheap, rental houses and building spaces
- There is freedom of expression and speech
- Access to city center (people can walk to town)
- Affordable foodstuff
- Access to health services
- Peaceful environment
- Job opportunities

- Availability of cash from neighboring middle class estates
- Supply of electricity
- Availability of CBO managed latrines.
- Availability of NGOs
- Availability of micro-finance organizations
- Hard working people who are self-reliant
- Lack of tribal discriminations
- Presence of religious organizations

Table 5.6: Community expression of development goals. The authors note that “people’s view might not always correspond to the reality but it helps in bringing out the real issues that concern the villagers” (2004: 11)

The development concerns, which emerged out of the desired vision, are:

- Construction of better houses
- Improved infrastructure
- Big markets (shopping centers)
- Title deeds to be given to residents
- Residents to be given the opportunity to construct their houses through funding

The other developments that the community would like to see in the village are:

- Police post to be constructed
- Government schools in the village established
- Government hospital
- Improved sewer system
- Space for churches and mosques construction
- Space for social halls
- Improved drainage
- Space for playing fields
- Boreholes to be drilled
- Electricity and streetlights
- Counseling centers

- Centers for disabled and orphans
- Boundary walls

Table 5.7: Summary results for PUA from community members of Soweto East village

Problems	Priority Projects	Community Contribution	Contribution Needed from outside
Men's Group: 1. Unemployment 2. Insecurity 3. Poor road network Women's Group: 1. Unemployment 2. High cost of education 3. Congested houses	1. Building of road network 2. Improving the houses 3. Building of public schools	1. Provision of manpower 2. Giving leeway/space for building the roads 3. Providing security for building materials	1. Building materials 2. Funding 3. Surveyors technical assistance

Table 5.8: Recommendations from PUA

- 1) Housing: The people of Soweto have diverse views on the required housing improvement. Although there is a proposed model on site the people feel left out. Therefore there is need to harmonise the developers' model and the community need/proposal. It is important to fully involve the community even in the adoption of the existing model.
- 2) Rents: There is a lot of uncertainty and fear that rents might go up after the upgrading has taken place. This is real fear and therefore there is need to give the community assurance that rents will not be hiked, a community rent regulation body can be put in place so as to keep the community informed on the expected changes.
- 3) Land Tenure: The landlords have fear of losing their plots after the upgrading. Therefore there is need to give them the required assurance that they will not be losers. Ways have to be sought of giving the landlords confidence by issuing TOL.'s like those issued to the people of Makina village.
- 4) Enhancing: The Role of Chiefs in Community Conflicts Resolution There are numerous types

of conflicts in the community especially between landlords and tenants over rent, tenants and tenants over children, churches over night meetings etc. The chief is the main conflict resolution person, the chiefs are overburdened and also ill equipped for social conflicts resolution. There is therefore need to train them of family law and social counselling skills.

- 5) Stakeholders participation: There are many stakeholders in Kibera who propagate and implement different types of development i.e. Education, health, and provision of water. However, the impact of their interventions is minimally felt, there is need to make them fully participate in the upgrading programme by utilizing the positive aspects of their development intervention.
- 6) Areas that need special focus: Education Primary Education in Kibera is mainly dominated by non-formal schools, which are NGO or community driven. There is no single public school, thus there is need to put up public schools within the villages. Health Facilities Improvement – The existing health facilities are either CBO run clinics or NGO promoted clinics; they need proper facilities and equipments. There is need for at least one health center in the area. HIV/AIDS Pandemic Prevalence and the spread of HIV/AIDS is widespread in Kibera and there are various interventions all over the settlement that are scattered and individualistic. There is need to bring all these actors together and have a meaningful and cheaper approach to help the infected and affected.
- 7) Creation of market centre: The people from Soweto village usually travel long distances to purchase merchandise for sale i.e. they go to industrial area, Dagoretti, Gikomba, Marigiti, Ruaraka, Kiambu etc. therefore there is need to provide for a market center in the village so as to reduce traveling time to the markets and also to promote local businesses. There is also need for a mobile Credit and Savings system to cater for the cash that circulates there.
- 8) The Vulnerable residents: There is a group of residents in Kibera who are really vulnerable and special consideration should be given to them otherwise they will be marginalized further. These include the following: Single mothers, Orphans, Disabled people, The poorest of the poor. The upgrading process should endeavour to consciously include and plan the needs of these people through out the upgrading process.

9) Fatigue: The people of Kibera are fatigued by too many questions and proposed interventions that have little or no impact. It is important that this upgrading is carried out differently so to win the confidence of the people.

5.3.1.3 The Settlement Executive Committee (SEC)

According to the official document published by the Ministry of Lands and Housing titled, “Terms of Reference (TOR) and Roles for the Settlement Executive Committee (SEC),” the “most significant and innovative aspect of the Kenya Slum Upgrading Programme is the enabling of the slum dwellers and other stakeholders to be fully and actively involved in improving their own livelihoods and neighbourhoods” (October, 2004). It goes on to say that, “in order to solicit the desired full and active involvement of slum dwellers, the Programme will establish Settlement Executive Committees (SEC) in every project area as part of its institutional arrangement.”

The Settlement Executive Committee (SEC) is “a committee formed by project beneficiaries through democratic elections to represent relevant stakeholders and the community members in the Kenya Slum Upgrading Programme (KENSUP)” (Ministry of Lands and Housing, 2004).

The original/official terms of reference recommended for the Settlement Executive Committees in each project area were listed as follows:

- a) mobilizing and facilitating community and settlement stakeholders for active participation in decision making, planning and implementation process to ensure ownership of the project.
- b) Sensitizing the community, disseminating information and soliciting views and perspectives of the community on the Programme and project-related issues through holding of regular meetings and sessions with settlement representatives and residents.
- c) Working with the community and the SPIU in determining and prioritizing the needs of the community.

- d) Marshaling community support for the programme and facilitating the mobilization of community and stakeholder resources for investment in the upgrading process.
- e) Representing interests of the community and providing linkage between the community on the one part and Programme Secretariat, PIU and SPIU on the other part, including facilitating smooth, efficient and adequate flow of information.
- f) Providing the SPIU, PIU and the Programme Secretariat with accurate and timely reports on the situation on the ground at all times.
- g) Creating unity among slum dwellers and stakeholders and ensuring that valid and reasonable views and interest of the slum dwellers are well taken care of throughout the project phases.

“The SEC consists of representatives from all the stakeholders. Each project area will have a SEC elected by members living and/or working within the settlement. As a starting point, and using the results of the Actors Study, all existing and active local organizations and groupings within the project area are identified and sensitized on the objectives and operations of the project, and the need to elect representatives. Each stakeholder group elects a representative(s) to the committee. Committee members are sensitised and finally guided to elect office bearers of the SEC from among themselves.” Given the importance of SEC in the innovative approach taken by the KENSUP Programme in Soweto East, and the importance of SEC members to the operation of the K-WATSAN project, the terms of reference for SEC members are summarized in Appendix 1 of this report.

5.3.1.4 The Multi Stakeholder Support Group (MSSG):

The Joint Project Planning Team (noted above) initiated a programme of consultation which led to “*a call for a common approach to slum upgrading*” and the subsequent request for each of the consulted sectors to nominate five members for what was to become the Multi-Stakeholder Support Group. On November 1, 2004, they agreed that a comprehensive Slum Upgrading Strategy was urgently required so as to serve as:

- 1 A road map and guide in Programme Implementation
- 2 An instrument for engaging stakeholders
- 3 An instrument for fund raising
- 4 A lead to better appreciation of the programme
- 5 A definition of what needs to be done, scope, of the programme and means of accomplishing what needs to be done

Table 5.9: Terms of Reference for the MSSG. (MSSG 2010)

- | |
|--|
| <ol style="list-style-type: none"> i. Periodic progress review of the Programme and process for necessary advice, information and support. ii. To facilitate the sharing and exchange of best practices on the programme process as necessary. iii. To assist in the sourcing of finance, project inputs and other requisite resources for the programme including for Social and physical infrastructure, and other Slum Upgrading organs. iv. To facilitate the financing of impact assessment and other relevant studies that may be deemed necessary. v. In liaison with Programme Secretariat and the Inter Agencies Steering Committee to organize bi-annual or annual reviews. |
|--|

Meetings take place annually and first MSSG meeting took place in November, 2001

5.3.2 KENSUP's Focus on Communication and Capacity Building

As part of the commitment to effective communication and outreach, KENSUP supported studies on identifying actors within the community, on determining how best to communicate with the community and on capacity building for effective participation in the KENUP. Four documents that reflect this commitment are considered below.



Photo 10 New sanitation blocks not only provide good quality basic water and sanitation services, but also provide a structure for community organization and for revenue generation. Funds generated by the sanitation blocks are controlled by the group members and may be used for mortgage savings.

5.3.2.1 Investigation of Actors Operating in Kibera – Volume I: Analytical Report. (January 2004)

The primary objective of this study was to provide an up-to-date “status report of the various actors operating in Kibera, their areas of focus, and their achievements” (2004:2). Various organizations and institutions involved in service provision (specifically ‘humanitarian’) were identified and classified into 9 major thematic areas (1) Religious, (2) Health Services, (3) Education and training, (4) Social welfare and support, (5) Water and Environmental sanitation, (6) HIV/AIDS, (7) Income generation and economic empowerment, (8) Public sector, and (9) Legal/Rights Organizations. The study noted implications/considerations for any upgrading programme based on information collected from each of these actors (Table 5.10).

Table 5.10: Comments on information collected from Actor Groups

- Given that religious groups are the majority, they can play a significant role in ‘opinion shaping’ for any activities within Kibera (2004: 8)
- Any upgrading programme may need to consider setting aside land for school buildings and play space (2004: 10)
- Social welfare and support actors are useful for community mobilization and can be “used effectively to disseminate information and shape opinion” (2004: 10)
- “Water and sanitation is a critical part of upgrading”; alternative water sources (i.e. boreholes to reduce reliance on piped water) are recommended; better organization at the macro-level is necessary (2004: 11)
- Organizations working with HIV/AIDS and issues related should be “mainstreamed” in any upgrading plans in order to strengthen existing interventions (2004: 11)
- Because many residents of Kibera live and work within the settlement, upgrading must consider providing “not only residential housing but also buildings that will accommodate business premises” (2004: 12)
- “Government regulation and provision of security is essential for any development” (2004: 12)
- “Legal and rights organization will be a necessary part of the civic education necessary for residents to understand their rights and responsibilities” (2004: 12)

It was found that many of the services provided within Kibera were village-specific. The majority of services provided in Soweto, for example, were religiously based (there were 29) as opposed to actors providing economic empowerment and income generating activities (there were 0).

Conclusions of this study were that, despite “the process of slum upgrading [causing] different emotions in different actor and residents” of Kibera, there is enough “goodwill among the slum dwellers across the whole spectrum of actors for participation in the process” (2004: 18). What needs to be addressed is:

- 1) The “rules of engagement with the different actors” needs to be “worked out”
- 2) Investment of time and resources by the different actors needs to be “harmonized and enhanced”
- 3) KENSUP is expected to coordinate/communicate an overall “master plan” for the upgrading programme to actors who, during the time of the study, were noted as being unaware of how to participate/what the overall plan was

5.3.2.2 Communication Strategy (October 2005)

This document serves to outline that communication is essential for the success of KENSUP.

Objective of a communication strategy is: “*To empower stakeholders to meaningfully participate in the implementation of slum upgrading projects.*” It identifies specific objectives as

- Create awareness, understanding and support for KENSUP at the community level
- Develop consensus amongst stakeholders and ensure full participation in planning, implementation, monitoring, and evaluation
- Sensitise stakeholders to understand complexity
- Develop efficient structures to communicate (promote free flow of info)
- Establish common platform
- Make past/present relevant information available/accessible

The report recommends a “multi-media approach to ensure maximum effect” (2005:6) and suggests that the communication channels/media/arenas proposed should include: the development of a website, newsletters, radio stations, video programs, mobile cinemas, seminars and public meetings, information centres, media visits (mainstream), public meetings for the

political leaders, breakfast meetings, hotline/toll-free number, and drama groups (2005:7-8). But, the report also notes that that a strong and clear communication strategy has not been effectively put in place to allow for the participation of all stakeholders in programme implementation (2005: 13). The following document addresses that.

**5.3.2.3 Handa, Caesar. “A Communication Action Plan: September – October, 2006,”
Strategic P.R. & Research.**

This document is explicit in articulating that it has been a very real problem for KENSUP, internally and externally, to frame the process of slum upgrading and the historical shift (from eviction/demolition to development/working with the community). A few examples of this are:

- “Poor communication exists between the various organs of KENSUP... admissions that some of the organs had never met together and were therefore not clear on what their roles are and how they should relate with the other organs” (2006: 7)
- “There is a clear lack of understanding of how the project will be implemented” (2006: 7)
- “The understanding varied from those who saw KENSUP as meant to construct improved housing for urban dwellers to those who understood it to be a government programme to enable slum residents to own the structures they are living in” (2006: 7)
- “Stakeholders identified the gaps in communication as one of the drawbacks in the implementation of the KENSUP programme” (2006: 11)

The report offers a detailed communication plan that would allow for an efficient and cost effective communication between the KENSUP organs and other stakeholders. (See page 19-22.) and concludes that

“The successful implementation of the KENSUP programme will depend, to a large extent, on the creation of a clear information channel that will allow for a smooth vertical and horizontal flow of information in the KENSUP structure. This calls for an understanding and appreciation of the role of communication by all actors in the KENSUP structure. Consequently, it calls for the understanding by each actor of their role in ensuring the flow. Of importance is to take cognizance of the need to infuse democratic principles in the communication structure that will allow for the representation of views of the community members and especially women, physically challenged, people living with HIV/AIDS widows and orphans” (2006: 24-25)

“KENSUP as a programme has been largely misunderstood even by the very people who are supposed to be implementing it. The situation is made worse by the politicization of the programme leading to speculations and in some cases resistance due to misinformation and propaganda. This history of slum upgrading in Kenya only adds to the justification for such resistance. The need therefore for proper accurate, well focused and timely information is important if not crucial to the success of the KENSUP programme” (2006: 27)

5.3.2.4 Senteu, Joseph K. “Capacity Building Assessment Report and Work Plan: November 2006-June 2009,” Dana Consult International (December 2006) *Published with SIDA

“In recognition of the need to involve all the stakeholders in slum upgrading, Swedish International Development cooperation Agency has provided funds to the government of Kenya to fund capacity building and community components of KENSUP.” This report aimed to assess and develop the work plan for the capacity building component of KENSUP with a particular focus on improving communication between Ministries (GoK), SIDA, within KENSUP itself, and with the community. The report lists underlying causes of slums (land tenure system is not being regulated; exclusion of slums/slum dwellers in planning processes; urban poverty due to rural-urban migration in 90s; lack of affordable housing; and the politicization of development/exploitation of the poor) and notes that KENSUP was initiated to address root causes of slums (2006: 2). It also says that KENSUP is bigger than a programme – it’s a process – and counts successes achieved by KENSUP as including: producing important foundational material, proposals, surveys and studies including a policy framework for slum upgrading, MOUs between UN-Habitat and GoK, the election/training of the Settlement Executive Committee (SEC), and the establishment of both Nairobi and Kibera Implementation Units (PIU/SPIU). But it notes that: *“The KENSUP institutional structure and arrangement, though capturing the spirit of the vision, mission and goals, have not adequately captured the core of the programme – **the community**.”* Although the programme aims to address the various past omissions in slum upgrading (i.e. land tenure, exclusion, and other root causes the report lists)

“the same could be repeated by KENSUP if deliberate efforts are not made by the government to involve all the stakeholders (and specifically the community) directly in the process. The issue of slum upgrading is essentially a human rights issue that also involves the development of a country’s democratic space.” The report concludes that: *“In its current state, provision of shelter seems to be the main focus”* (2006: 7).

The author writes that documentation produced by KENSUP is good, but that many studies have established the magnitude and intricacies of slums, but strategies to cope with those complexities haven’t been established (and are needed, otherwise KENSUP will fail – like other efforts). The most critical need is “to coordinate the various actors as to ensure effective utilization of resources and minimize duplication of efforts and to avoid distortion.”

5.3.2.5 Concluding Thoughts

All four of these documents discuss the importance and challenge of effective communication. Given the diversity of needs within Kibera alone, the complexity of defining, communicating, and executing a Nation-wide slum-upgrading programme without an effective communication strategy (from the beginning) has most certainly worked against the success of the KENSUP. As is clearly evidenced by these KENSUP reports, the problem is not in failing to understand the importance of communication and engagement, but rather in not having proven “best practices” from previous successful pilot studies to draw on. The KENSUP commitment in Soweto East is a pilot project, and so communication and engagement successes demonstrated in the Soweto East project will have value far beyond the site. The K-WATSAN project served as a critical entry point for KENSUP in Kibera, and so the identifying, and learning from the successes of the project is critical. The next section examines the K-WATSAN process.

5.4 Findings: The K-WATSAN Storyline

Kibera Integrated Water, Sanitation, and Waste Management Project is a pilot demonstration project implemented in Soweto East... The project is executed in collaboration with the Government of Kenya, the Kenyan NGO Maji na Ufanisi (Water and Development), local residents, and the private sector. The project is a follow-up of the Kibera Slum Upgrading Initiative, which was concluded in June 2004 and achieved

the following: 1) institutional structures were established within Soweto East, including a settlement executive committee, a programme implementation unit, and an inter-agency coordination committee; 2) physical mapping and socio-economic analysis of Soweto East were completed in collaboration with the Government of Kenya; 3) a draft master plan for Kibera” (Candiracci and Syrjänen, 2007).

Following the early successes of UN-Habitat in Kibera, a proposal for the Kibera Integrated Water Sanitation and Waste Management project was drafted with a planned starting date of November, 2005. This document proposed a budget of Total Budget: US\$ 318,000 with UN-Habitat contributing US\$ 278,000 and G.O.K contributing US\$ 40,000 in cash and kind. It appears that this was revised and approved as Project Code: 2006- FWS- 5448- W001- 2831, with an increase budget of US\$ 579,684 and partners including the Government of Kenya under the Kenya Slum Upgrading Programme (KENSUP) and Maji na Ufanisi (Water and Development) with a starting date January 2006 and an expected completion date of 2008. This spelled out the “integrated” nature of the engagement – while water and sanitation were the core elements, the themes of the programme were listed as follows (Table 5.11)

Table 5.11 K-WATSAN Core Themes (Abridged from MnU and UNH DOC. 2006).

1. Support the community to improve accessibility to water and sanitation in Soweto East,
2. Establish and strengthen governance frameworks to regulate distribution and accessibility to water and for the upgrading of demonstrations,
3. Support community organization through the formation of Water and Sanitation (WATSAN) management committees as a vehicle for promoting small scale waste management enterprises, increased access to water and sanitation services and access for credit to facilitate improvement of housing sector,
4. Support the community to improve the drainage system in Soweto East,
5. Initiate small scale door to door waste collection and recycling initiatives based on the cooperative approach.
6. To enable the Soweto East community gain basic knowledge about computers, software and internet and supply the opportunity to participate in online discussions, send emails,

search for information etc.

7. To popularise within the community a non-motorised transport system (improved bicycle transporter) for the improvement of livelihoods within the urban poor.

UNH and MnU, the implementing partner, prepared a 228 page study for the project which listed project components as:

- 1: Assembling of Technical Team & Orientation
- 2: Introductory Site Meetings
- 3: Site Office Establishment
- 4: Community Mobilization & Participation
- 5: Verification, Planning & Programming
- 6: Detailed Surveying, Design & Siting
- 7: Construction
- 8: Community Capacity Building
- 9: Monitoring & Evaluation
- 10: Environmental Restoration
- 11: Commissioning & Handing-Over

And listed project elements as

- 1: Site & Administration Office
- 2: Improvement of Access & Drainage
- 3: Improvement of Access to Water & Sanitation Services
- 4: Solid Waste Management Facilities
- 5: Resource Centre

The non-motorized transport component was to be handled through a parallel agreement with “Practical Action” was a resumption of the Kibera Bicycle Transport Project led by Patrick Analo (May 2005). It is not discussed in further detail in this report.

The K-WATSAN Technical Report includes both detailed engineering specifications and project management plans for the road construction (General Specifications for Building Materials & Workmanship) produced by Mr. Njue Njoka, and a detailed Environmental Impact Assessment

produced by Richard Laurel Moku. This report makes it clear that at every step that involves physical engineering works, there is also to be wide consultation and inclusion of community members. Notably, the management is comprised of

- *Project Management Team (PMT)* – This carry overall management, quality control and monitoring of the project. It will comprise of the Team Leader, Project Manager, and Project Accountant. It will be composed of the following experts.
- *Project Socio-Technical Team (PST)* – This will comprise of Project Manager, Project Architect, Project Sociologist, Civil/Structural Engineer, Project Technicians (water & sanitation, building & construction, and access roads construction), Community Organizers, and Project Artisans/foremen, storekeepers, bookkeepers, and security men. This team will be actively involved in the day-to-day implementation of the project.

Part of the preparation was a sensitization workshop on the WATSAN project on 13th - 14th February 2006. The goals were to build awareness on the WATSAN project among stakeholders; identify roles/responsibilities and contributions of the various stakeholders; and agree on an agreed action plan. Participants included representatives from the KENSUP Secretariat, Settlement Executive Committee (SEC), Nairobi City Council Settlement Project Implementation Unit (SPIU), Nairobi Water and Sewerage Company (NAWASCO), Athi Water Services Board, Ministry of Cooperative and UN-Habitat. The output of the meeting included a listing of the roles and responsibilities of the stakeholders, and a list of capacity building objective. Of particular note is the list of responsibilities for the community representative on the Settlement Executive Committee (SEC). **Roles and responsibilities** are listed as

1. Community mobilization and sensitization
2. Link the project and the community (with reference to the master plan)
3. In collaboration with the community will identify the sites for the implementation of various components of the project.
4. Will oversee the proper day to day running of the two WATSAN committee
5. Will vet the workforce for the implementation of the components.

6. Will provide together with the community members the storage and security of the equipment for waste recycling facilities.
7. Will identify people infected and affected with HIV/AIDS and organize for their assistance.
8. Will monitor and report on the progress of the project to KENSUP.
9. Will carry out conflict resolution in collaboration with the SPIU.
10. Exchange programme /visits to similar projects that are already operational

Amongst the list of capacity building objects were: project management skills, book keeping, business planning and general financial management; Training on office operation (Computer literacy); Report writing and formal meeting organization and Community development skills. These skills would not only help advance the project by improving links with the community, but the members of SEC would also benefit personally from the training received.

The construction of the Soweto East Access Road was the most conspicuous and ambitious aspect of the project. On June 6, 2007, a letter from UN-Habitat to the Permanent Secretary Ministry of Housing noted that the GoK had suggested government design standards and that it would therefore cost more than budgeted. Several meetings of the Soweto East Access Road led to an agreement March 6, 2008, that the government would construct part of the road and a section would be retained by the K-WATSAN project. It was agreed the *“relocation of people within the road reserve will be done in two phases (from Silanga to the bridge and from the bridge to the GoK 500 meters road)”* and that the building of the road would *“Use local and manual labor in order to ensure the involvement of the community; create income opportunities; develop labor skills; and increase a sense of ownership.”* It was further agreed that a road committee would be established, comprising up to seven people living within the road reserve, to facilitate assist with community engagement.

Because of delays in the project and changes to the road design, on Mar 26, 2008, the agreement between Maji and UN-Habitat was extended by ten months (to Oct, 2008) to allow work to be completed. UN-Habitat provided additional funds of US\$ 112,067, bringing the total amount of

the contribution to US\$ 633,783 (Candiracci, 2008). A further extension was granted to May 30, 2010 due to delays (outlined in Table 5.12) and to further changes to the design of the road. That brought the total budget to USD \$1,057,058.95.

Table 5.12: Abridged from “Amendment to the Agreement of Cooperation between United Nations Human Settlements Programme and Maji na Ufanisi, February 2009”

Unavoidable delays

1. Rigorous community mobilization and buy in: This has not been a one off activity but an ongoing intervention for the life of the project.
2. Space acquisition: This was one of the greatest challenges facing implementation of the project. It has taken six months to acquire spaces for the 8th community resource facility, the construction of which has now begun in February 2009. The space initially identified at K-WATSAN Mokorino has had controversies from community members besides having a complex of about twenty pit latrines.
3. Poor accessibility: Construction materials for all the sanitation facilities and for improvement of drains have had to be carried from the bulk materials storage site (Rugendo’s) on the back by women and on the heads by men.
4. Workers rotation schedules: To ensure that as many residents in Soweto East got an opportunity to work in the projects, workers are rotated on a weekly basis.

Road construction

5. Discussions on road construction: It has taken over 2 years to agree on the width of the access road, the class and on the organization or company to undertake the construction. This has been sorted out in the last one week of February 2009.
6. Relocation: ...people relocate to other parts of the village to pave way for the access road.

Post election violence:

7. Like in all other slums in Nairobi our work stalled for four months as other issues (e.g. peace meetings and relief distribution) took precedence.

Escalation of costs

8. Kibera is underlain by a hard rock stratum. This made sewer line excavation very expensive.
9. Very challenging working terrain made the work difficult.

10. The distances covered to reach the main sewer lines and those to get to the water mains were long and sometimes went through Soweto resident's houses.
11. Cost of materials and change of specifications: The cost of materials over the last one year has gone up by about 30% due to inflation..
12. Toilet exhaustion: Almost all the areas where sanitation facilities were constructed were former pit latrines. The areas are also not accessible for exhausters and exhaustion had to be done manually.

Other additional costs

13. Four guards (two day and two night guards) and one office caretaker have been engaged.
14. Exhaustion costs for temporary pit latrines in all sites throughout the construction period

In May 2008, it was reported that the decanting site – consisting of 600 housing units in seventeen 17 blocks – was 98% complete and that a strategy for identifying and relocating persons from Soweto East had been “*finalized and was ready for implementation by a relocation committee.*” On September 15, 2009, a GOK press release announced that “*Kibera-Soweto East Zone A residents will be relocating to the Lang’ata Decanting Site on September 16th, 2009, [and] the Right Honorable Prime Minister, Raila Odinga will officiate the Relocation Launch [on site].*”

An in-house summary report, dated September 12, 2008, listed the state of progress on eleven project aspects as follows (Table 5.12) (Candiracci, 2008).

Table 5.12 Abridged from UN-Habitat Activities in Kibera Slums, Nairobi, Kenya 12 September, 2008

1. Sanitation Facilities

Seven large sanitation facilities are nearing completion and capacity building courses are being conducted for the management groups.

2. Road Works

The goal of the road improvement is to enhance an entire 2 kilometers directly through the center of Kibera with pavement, walkways, storm drains that are sensitive to pedestrian traffic and good for business. GOK with support from UN-Habitat has cleared the first 500

meters of the 2 kilometer road and the construction activities are ongoing. A relocation committee for the remaining part of the road has been selected and the work has started with more than 50 structures having been relocated.

3. Design & Redevelopment Committee for low cost housing and development plan

Four Housing Cooperatives have registered by GOK covering the 4 zones with 3,300 members with a capita base of Ksh. 200,000/=. A Technical Design & Redevelopment Committee has been established by the PS of Ministry of Housing with technical support from UN-Habitat.

4. Settlement Executive Committee and replication in other Kibera villages

In addition to the Soweto-East SEC, other SECs have been formed in Laini Saba and Silanga villages.

5. Non-Motorized Transport Project

The NMT Project component started at the end of June.

6. Post-election violence, peace building, SG Ban Ki Moon Youth Training Initiative

During the post-election violence, UN-Habitat Water and Sanitation Branch has organized various meetings to facilitate a dialogue for peace building. UN-Habitat and UNICEF have expressed interest in a Resource Center, a multipurpose facility for specialized disabled children, training and a youth outreach.

7. Electricity and Kenya Power and Lighting Corporation (KPLC)

UN-Habitat and KPLC have extended electricity to 1,000 units on an experimental project unprecedented in Kenya.

8. Negotiations with African Development Bank (AfDB)

UN-Habitat submitted a project proposal to the AfDB and the regional development bank agreed to allocate USS\$ 1 million to work in Kibera on slum upgrading with a view to establish a lending facility for water, sanitation and infrastructure capable of taking upgrading to scale.

9. PM's "grand plan" for Kibera

The PM is also the local MP for the area of Kibera. He has shown a lot of interest in the project.

10. Decanting (temporary housing) site: The decanting site is almost complete with over

250 housing units. Tenants will pay rates slightly above their present rent levels. GOK acknowledges that while it prepared good designs and development, it was not cost effective at the implementation stage, vulnerable to price-increases by contractors.

11. Housing Finance: UN-Habitat is working under an MOU with Housing Finance Company, a primary mortgage company to pilot innovative financing models... The model, piloted in Mavoko, will be applied in Kibera once it field-tested. In 2004, in Mavoko, UN-Habitat and GOK initiated the Sustainable Neighborhood Programme (SNP), the product of a “debt swap,” whereby GOK agreed to release to UN-Habitat 250 acres of land for low-income property development upon agreeing with the Government of Finland to waive sovereign debt it had owed to Finland.

Similarly, a report from March, 2009, reports progress as summarized in Table 5.13 and Table 5.14 offers a retrospective on the K-WATSAN taken from a 2011 UN-Habitat document.

Table 5.13 – Abridged from “Kibera Integrated Water, Sanitation & Waste Management Project Status Report” (March, 2009) by Harrison Kwach.

Activities	Current Status
<p><i>Sanitation blocks</i> <i>Eight Sanitation facilities</i> <i>Established</i></p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Seven sanitation blocks (5 sewerred and 2 pits) were commissioned by the E.D. UN-Habitat last December. • Facility management committees for the sanitation blocks formed and legitimately registered to run the facilities • Eighth sanitation facility to be constructed as part of the ICT/Health rehabilitation centre during the requested extension period. • Storm water drains installed to safeguard the facilities • All the facilities have piped water connection, 10,000 ltr storage tanks and a communal stand pipe serving the neighbourhood.

<p><u>Solid Waste Management</u> <i>Community based organisation formed to manage waste management system</i> <i>Garbage Transfer points (receptacles) constructed</i> <i>Garbage Recycling facility established</i></p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Soweto Youth Group formed, registered and operational. • Waste collection receptacles established within the sanitation facilities • Waste recycling centre secured and construction to be completed during the requested extension period
<p><u>Resource Centre:</u> <i>Community resource centre and health rehabilitation for the disabled constructed</i></p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Site for the centre identified and secured • Relocation of structures within the site completed • Site clearance to empty 13 old latrine pits and backfilling with hard core completed
<p><u>Community capacity building and advocacy</u> <i>Community structure established for the management of the entire project</i></p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Settlement Executive Committee (SEC) strengthened as a local coordinating structure • Road Relocation committee established and working to relocate those on the road reserved • WATSAN Committee established and addressing the water and sanitation related issues in the village • 4 Housing cooperatives formed and registered in Soweto East. • Financial savings through the cooperative on going • All facility management groups linked to the cooperatives • Training on health and hygiene completed

<p><i>KENSUP site Office</i> <i>Office operationalised</i></p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Water connection to the office completed • Office sanitation facility constructed • Electrification completed
<p><i>Road Works & Drainage</i> <i>750 m Road Construction to bitumen level; Storm Water Drains on both sides of the road installed</i></p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Design of the road completed and presented for approval at Nairobi City Council • Survey to mark the actual size of the road completed • Grading of the road is done up to 100m • Relocation of structure and other facilities on the road reserve on going • 1500 m of storm water drainage to be installed to safeguard the road

Table 5.14 UN-Habitat and the Kibera Slum Upgrading Initiative 2011

UN-Habitat proposes a simple and cost effective approach to help address the challenge of slums...whereby small-scale interventions are carried out to serve as a start to provide inspiration and reinforce daily life. Streets and public spaces play a major role...and are seen... as public domain where social, cultural and economic activities are articulated, reinforced and facilitated. Improving these outdoor spaces would improve the framework for daily activities and would bring dignity, beauty and facilitate utility services to various poor areas.

The approach entails the active participation of the local community in all facets of the project development and implementation... The involvement of NGO's, government and local authorities, private entities, donor community and civil society organisations are considered as critical.

In Nairobi 60 percent of the population live in severely disadvantaged conditions... the number of slum dwellers expected to double within the next 15 years. Kibera is one of the largest informal settlements in Africa, with an estimated population of 200,000 inhabitants living on 256 hectares of land under appalling conditions. In 2004, UN-Habitat and the Government of Kenya set up the Kenya Slum Upgrading Programme (KENSUP),

Through a community-driven process, UN-Habitat's intervention in Kibera primarily focused on the

development of an integrated physical and social infrastructure system (e.g. main street and sidewalks; electricity; water, sanitation and waste management infrastructure and facilities; resource center), linked to income generation and pro-poor governance.

The intervention has shown a combination of new and innovative concepts and strategies to demonstrate that in the large informal settlements, with a high population density and few economic resources, crucial improvements in the quality of life, dignity and equality can be ensured with significantly minimal resources, if properly planned.

GUIDING PRINCIPLES

The intervention in Kibera has demonstrated a combination of new and innovative concepts and strategies, critical for the success of any slum upgrading programme.

National government's commitment – Partnerships – Inclusive participation – Delegated decision-making – Sustainability – Communication – Good governance – Gender awareness – Public Private Partnerships –

Accomplishments:

Situation analysis and socio-economic and physical mapping of Soweto East – Enumerations ratify the location where people live, but also the rights of individuals and slum dwellers over the land they occupy (*US\$ 240,000*).

Establishment of project management committees within Soweto East – The institutional sustainability of the different initiatives was achieved through the establishment of the Settlement Executive Committee, the Programme Implementation Unit, and the Inter-agency Coordination Committee, that monitor and coordinate the implementation of project activities at the local level (*US\$ 50,000*).

Empowerment of community members through training – To achieve sustainable urbanisation, training community members in practices, such as construction, water supply, sanitation and solid waste was at the core of this project. (*US\$ 164,297*).

Construction of a main street and sidewalks – A low-volume street with storm drains and pedestrian walkways has been built. It has increased accessibility for residents as well as for the authorities and public services (e.g. bus services, police and fire and ambulance services). (*US\$ 923,299*).

Improvement of water and sanitation conditions – Storm water drains have been provided and seven communal water and sanitation facilities have been built. Additionally, seven facility management

groups have been set up and capacity building activities conducted to enhance their capacity to facilitate the management of the facilities. (US\$ 236,632).

Establishment of a community and youth resource center – A community and youth resource center has been built to house a one-stop youth center, a medical dispensary for small children and expectant mothers, a physiotherapy facility for children with disabilities and an additional communal/social hall for general community use (US\$ 239,762)

Provision of household power connections – Electricity was extended to 1,000 units in Soweto East in conjunction with the Kenya Power and Lighting Company (KPLC). (KPLC contribution).

Support the design and construction of low-cost houses and development plan –1,000 families have been relocated to the temporary housing facilities. The families are currently paying a subsidized rent of Kshs 500/unit/month (Euro 5). The architectural designs was approved by the community. The new plan includes: three community centres, 1 commercial center, 1,300 housing units, infrastructure development, high rise/mixed development.

Empowerment of community members through housing cooperatives – Most of urban poor are excluded from access to conventional housing finance. Four Housing Cooperatives have been registered, with 3,300 members and a capital base of Ksh 200,000 (Euro 2,000) (US\$ 60,000).

5.5 Findings: Following K-WATSAN

On Sept 15, 2009, a press release was issued stating that “Soweto East Zone A residents will be relocating to the Lang’ata Decanting Site on September 16th, 2009. The Right Honorable Prime Minister, Raila Odinga will officiate the Relocation Launch at the Lang’ata Decanting Site. The Kenya Slum Upgrading Programme (KENSUP) theme for the Relocation Exercise is “towards a slum-free nation”. However, construction of the new structures was not to follow immediately. As reported July 5, 2010 (Daily Nation) the site clearance had been delayed by legal action initiated by those who claimed to be structure owners.

Amnesty International also intervened at this time. Their publication, “Kenya, The Unseen Majority: Nairobi’s 2 Million Slum Dwellers,” (AI 2009) was issued as part of their “Demand Dignity Campaign” and was intended to provide an overview of the “human rights issues raised by the Kenyan government’s approach to slums and informal settlements” (2009: 4).

The report drew its information (overview and recommendations) from interviews with individuals and focus groups discussions conducted by AI delegates which took place over a three month period with “more than 200 residents of 5 [different] informal settlements and slums in Nairobi,” including Kibera (2009: 4).

AI’s main critique of the KENSUP pilot project in Soweto East can be summarized in four points: (1) The programme has failed to assess vulnerability within the community, and therefore failed to protect more vulnerable persons in the upgrading scheme in Soweto East (2009: 25). In particular, AI was concerned with those business owners who relied on the ability to run a small kiosk in the community for income/livelihood. (If they cannot, what will they do?) (2009: 15) (2) The lack of information and consultation coupled with the general failure of past slum upgrading projects in Kenya to benefit the urban poor has led to a general distrust towards the project (2009: 25). (3) There are unaddressed fears that new housing will not be affordable/accessible for current residents of Soweto East – confirmed in multiple interviews with individuals, as well as in an interview cited with a member of the KENSUP Secretariat saying no commitment had been (or “could be”) made to ensure the rent for new housing would be higher (2009: 26). (4) A mechanism to create “security of tenure” for Soweto East residents is not apparent in the pilot project, despite the GoK’s commitment to “integrate the settlements into the formal physical and economic framework of urban centres and above all to guarantee security of tenure” (2009: 22).

AI’s Priority Recommendations to the GoK were (2009: 5):

- Develop guidelines that comply with international law, legislate, enforce, and cease all forced evictions
- Ensure implementation of KENSUP consults affected community members and complies with the right to adequate housing while ensuring affordability/accessibility (particularly for disadvantaged sections of the community)

- Ensure KENSUP and policies address immediate needs of residents in terms of security of tenure and access to essential services

The Soweto East Peoples Forum – the community group that was self-appointed as the “watch dog” of KENSUP – worked with Amnesty on this campaign, drawing much of its advocacy skill from AIs support.

Finally, with a court approval, on January 12, 2012, the clearance of the site of the new structures began (with some conspicuous resistance within the community, and some negative press coverage) (Daily Nation), and on March 6th, 2012, President Kibaki launched what the Daily Nation reported as *“the Sh3 billion Kibera People Settlement Development project that will result in the construction of 900 housing units...230 business stalls, a nursery school, a social hall, a youth centre, three solid waste handling sheds, three toilet blocks and a boundary wall.”* Presently, construction is underway.

The following section reviews the impacts that K-WATSAN had within the community and attempts to assess whether the objectives set by the PUA, KENSUP strategy documents and K-WATSAN itself have been met, and, if so, what the impact has been. Once that is established, lessons learned from the process are explored, and implications for replication and scaling up are considered.

6 THE IMPACT: K-WATSAN / KENSUP SOWETO EAST SURVEY RESULTS

6.1 General Introduction

In order to measure aspects of the impact of K-WATSAN and KENSUP - Soweto East, field surveys were conducted during the July and August of 2012. At this time, most of the component of the K-WATSAN project had been completed, with the road sidewalks (or “footpaths”) and drains as a notable exception, and the construction of the new housing units had only just commenced. These data are part of an larger, ongoing study by authors, and are summarized briefly with some results analyzed within this document.

A total of 275 valid surveys were conducted amongst three groups (N shows the number in each group).

- The Road (N=180). This was the largest and most general survey, with interviews being conducted with users of the new access road and conducted with various people along the road during the day. The majority of respondents were kiosk operators or were employed in small informal businesses. Others were shopping or travelling along the road.
- Kiosks (N=30). This was a smaller survey conducted with kiosk operators only. This focused on more detailed questions about the impact of the road on business, and asked about the levels of interest in kiosks being provided by the Nairobi City Council.
- Sanitation Blocks (N=65). This survey involved some users of the Sanitation Blocks with a particular focus on members of the Facility Management Groups (FMGs) and the corresponding Facility Management Committee (FMC). They were of particular interest since they were not immediate targets of the relocation, but were actively involved in, and benefitted directly from, the K-WATSAN and KENSUP Programme in Soweto East.

6.1.1 Objectives

The specific objectives of the survey were to:

- Understand the perceived change in quality of life arising from the construction of the access road into the slum.

- Identify reasons for the expressed change.
- Determine the level of engagement that respondents felt with respect to planning and project implementation.
- Collect demographic information about respondents
- Using a list of “impact variables”, determine how things were before the start of the project; how things were at the time of the interviews (i.e. the present experience), and; how things were expected to be when all phases of KENSUP were completed (i.e. the future expectations). (Note: This was intended to identify not only satisfaction levels with progress to date, but to document optimism about continued progress.)
- Identify positive and negative attributes of living in the community, as well as getting information about greatest perceived needs.
- Allow some exploration of how demographic or experiential attributes correlate with all of the above.

6.1.2 Methods

Survey ideas and topics were discussed with actors within the K-WATSAN and KENSUP process and key themes were identified and incorporated into draft questionnaires. A group of six field assistants from within the community was carefully identified by key informants and brought together for training to ensure surveys were conducted with a high a degree of standardization. Training involved a commitment/agreement with the field assistants to ensure the confidentiality and informed consent of all research participants/survey respondents. All field assistants were given copies of an official letter of request to read and/or show any research participant should they wish to see (and/or sign) it. Also included in this training was an overview of who the consultant was, who the research associate was, and what their affiliations (i.e. to McGill), commitments, and intentions were. Each survey had a brief summary of these points printed at the top. After this training, a pilot version of each survey was conducted and feedback from field assistants and from the data was used to revise the questionnaires. Once an agreed format had been produced, field assistants took the printed surveys into the community and conducted interviews. For reasons of literacy and language barriers, the questionnaires were conducted orally in either Kiswahili or English, but answers were recorded in English.

Once the surveys were completed, data were transferred to spreadsheets. Quantitative data were used as entered whereas qualitative data were either coded, *a posteriori*, using codes generated by the researchers based on the array of responses, or were used as narrative text to clarify other replies.

In the circumstances, it was not possible to fully randomize respondent selection, and it is possible that this will have skewed results. The reasons for non-randomization include:

- (i) for the kiosk and sanitation block surveys, the groups are small and an attempt was made to get a large and representative cross-section of the group.
- (ii) for the road survey, an effort was made to ensure randomization (asking interviewers to select the 5th person past after completing after a fixed time marker, for example). However, as people were busy and perhaps had other reasons for not wanting to participate, to an extent, the results are skewed to those who were willing, and who may therefore have had a particular interest in expressing an opinion.
- (iii) as with all of this work, there is the risk of a “gatekeeper” bias. In other words, people who respond could somehow be connected with the people who are participating in the project (i.e. the field assistants) and are therefore not necessarily representative of the full group. While every effort was made to prevent that, it was necessary to rely on those who are already a part of the community, if only for security reasons .

Despite these constraints, it is clear that the surveys represent the views of a significant segment of the community. For each of the surveys, the results are presented as follows:

- Respondents: who replied in the survey;
- Impact: how respondents report changes arising from the K-WATSAN and the KENSUP project in Soweto East; this addresses both actual material changes (as in access to water) and levels of optimism (as in expected final consequences of the project);
- Process: how respondents view the process of public engagement used in the project;
- Implications: what comments in the survey suggest about the individual responses.

6.2 Results: The Road Survey

6.2.1 Respondents

Respondents ranged in age from 6 to 59 years with an average age of 31. (Table 6.2.1. and Fig 6.2.1a.). Sixty seven percent worked, while about one quarter looked after families and on sixth were looking for work. (Fig 6.2.1b).

Table 6.2.1. Age by Gender				
	Gender			
Age Class	Female	Male	ND	Grand Total
U20	6	3	1	10
U30	33	43	10	86
U40	24	22	3	49
U50	5	15	1	21
50+	4	6		10
ND	1	1	2	4
Grand Total	73	90	17	180

Fig 6.2.1a. The age and gender distribution.





Fig 6.2.1b. Main activity of respondents.



6.2.2 Impact

The impact of the access road is reported to have been outstandingly positive (Fig 6.2.2) and, particularly, it has positively impact reported safety (Fig 6.2.3). The measures of impact on, and optimism about, aspects of community life, likewise, show an enormous increase positive ratings from past, to present, to expectation about the future. (Fig 6.2.4-A,B, and C)

Fig 6.2.2 Impact of the road on living conditions.




Fig 6.2.3 Impact of the road on safety.




Fig 6.2.4A Perspective on living conditions before KENSUP began.




Fig 6.2.4B Perspective on living conditions now.





Fig 6.2.4C Perspective on living conditions likely when project is completed.



6.2.3 Process

Clearly, most of the respondents of the road survey did not participate in community consultations (Fig 6.2.5), but most (57%) knew people who did. Those who did not participate, but who knew people who did, would clearly be aware that an effort had been made to solicit the views of the community and that there were opportunities for input. Despite that, 65% of

respondents did not feel that the views of the community were well understood (Fig 6.2.6), even though slightly more than half agreed that the design of the access road was what the community wanted (Fig 6.2.7)

Fig 6.2.5. Degrees of participation in consultation.




Fig 6.2.6. Perception of effectiveness of participation.





Fig 6.2.7. Linking consultation with final road design.



6.2.4 Implications

These data demonstrate that the K-WATSAN and KENSUP project has accomplished the intended main objectives. That is, respondents reported dramatic increases in quality of life as a result of the road intervention, a marked overall improvement in all of the impact variables, and a very high degree of “buy in” as shown by great optimism for continued improvement in the impact variables. In respect of the process, there is a reasonably widespread understanding that it did involve outreach to the community and offered an opportunity for input, but the particular modes of outreach used were contested. (See Section 7 for further explanation.) And while there is clearly some sense that the design of the road could have been modified to better reflect the community wishes, half of respondents reported that the design was what the community wanted.

Narrative responses expanded on the results outlined above, describing in greater detail the best things about the road (i.e. “boosted business” and “better access to/for goods and services within Kibera”) and worst things about the road (i.e. “increased occurrence of accidents” and “poor drainage”). They also included suggestions for what might help future projects have greater, positive impacts and some of these directly correspond to the concern regarding accidents and missing infrastructure. For example, to decrease the occurrence of road accidents, many suggested that speed bumps, road lights, better drainage, footpaths, and road signs/markings be created. One research participant suggested that “educating the community on how to ensure


road safety and road measures/maintenance (especially cleanliness)” would be beneficial, given that the community has functioned with smaller, unpaved roads to date.

Informal interviews and participant observation confirmed that the general impact of the road on businesses, services, and accessibility has been positive overall, but, as with the survey data, many people felt that it was “unfinished” and would be greatly improved by addressing issues of safety with further infrastructure.

There were violent incidents that took place during the time of field research that were explained as being directly connected to the new road which is a departure from these overall positive records of impact. Four research participants (Interviews: June, 2012) noted that the road resulted in an “opening up” and “exposure” to strangers had effectively altered the systems in place for ensuring community safety (i.e. community policing). While statistical evidence does not exist about the occurrence of armed robbery in Soweto East or in Kibera at large, two incidents took place along the road in the course of fieldwork for this research. In one incident, 3 people were shot dead by undercover police (1 person as an “innocent bystander” used as a shield) and, in another, a community resident attempting to alert police was shot by a the group of robbers themselves. According to at least some research participants interviewed, these incidents *are* explained as being a result of having an open road flow through a congested settlement. It was never an argument against the road itself, to clarify (i.e. that roads should not be built because they cause violence) but it was a real result and concern. Furthermore, the relative success of businesses along the road (which was recorded as positive in the kiosk survey) has created a growing divide between those who are earning income from increased foot traffic, and those who are unemployed and dealing with challenges related to absolute poverty. For example, the number of M-PESA shops – a mobile-phone based money transfer and micro-financing service, well known for being a dynamic new business sector – is growing along the road. Because handguns are cheap and available in Kibera, and because unemployment is high (amongst other challenges) robberies of these particular shops have increased according to research participants (August, 2012).

6.3 The Sanitation Block Survey


Respondents



All of the respondents in this survey were members of the Facility Management Committees (FMC), Facility Management Groups (FMG) or users of the Sanitation Blocks. Therefore, unlike those in the road survey, all were members of defined groups that were specific beneficiaries of the KWATSAN project. In this case, fewer than half worked and over one third were actively seeking work. Many looked after families (20.3%) and two of the respondents attended school. (Fig 6.3.1a). Roughly half were female and most respondent fell into the under 30, and 30-40 age class. (Table 6.3.1. and Fig 6.3.1b)

Age Class	Female	Male	Not rec	Grand Total
U30	9	8	2	19
U40	8	12	2	22
U50	6	4		10
U60	3	4	2	9
Grand Total	26	28	6	60


**Fig 6.3.1b Age by Gender
(U30 = under 30 etc)**



Impact

The impact of the Sanitation Blocks is reported to have been outstandingly positive (Fig 6.3.2), with most people using the blocks “often” or “daily” (Fig 6.3.3). The measures of impact on, and optimism about aspects of community life, likewise, show an enormous increase positive ratings from past, to present, to expectation about the future. (Fig 6.3.4-A, B, and C)

Fig 6.3.2 How has the Sanitation Block affected your living conditions in Kibera?






Fig 6.3.4A Perspective on living conditions before KENSUP began.




Fig 6.3.4B Perspective on living conditions at time of study.





Fig 6.3.4C Perspective on living conditions likely when KENSUP is finished.



Process

In this case, most of the respondents (56%) participated in community consultations (Fig 6.3.5) but 80% knew other people who had (Fig 6.3.6). Because these were targeted groups, the level of engagement was expected to be higher, and almost 90% of respondents thought that the views of the community were well understood (Fig 6.3.6). Likewise, the same number (89%) thought that the design was what the community wanted (Fig 6.3.7). Almost 80% answered “yes” to the question of whether the community decided/designed the structure and membership of the Facilities Management Committees (FMCs) and only 9% felt that they had not (Fig 6.3.8).

Fig 6.3.5. Degree of participation in consultation.




Fig 6.3.6 Personal link to participants.




Fig 6.3.7. Were community's view understood?





Fig 6.3.8. Community role in creating local management structure.



Implications

These data again show that the K-WATSAN project has accomplished the intended main objectives. More specifically, respondents reported dramatic increases in quality of life as a result of the intervention which, in this case, was the process and construction of the Sanitation Blocks. There is a similar dramatic overall improvement and great optimism for continued improvement in all of the impact variables. In respect of the process, there is a much higher degree of direct involvement with the project implementation team and, as might be expected, a much higher level of satisfaction both with the extent to which planners understood community wishes and the extent to which final designs reflected community wishes.

Narrative responses corresponded with these findings demonstrating that the design of the toilets was what the community wanted (saying they were "modern, clean toilets"). They also specifically noted that the Sanitation Blocks have reduced flying toilets, the transmission of disease/diseases, and crime (i.e. rape). People also spoke specifically about how the blocks have united people, created affordable/accessible services and improved hygiene, security, and made the environment better in general (i.e. less polluted). Importantly, people recognized that it was a source of income for individuals *and* the community, and expressed this as making a significant impact on the living conditions for people in Kibera.

While the level of organization of the management committees and the effect the blocks have had on uniting residents, research participants noted, overwhelmingly and most consistently, that the best thing about the sanitation block was the reduction of flying toilets. This speaks both to the nature of the problem, and how large the problem is, and also to the effect of *changing* this response by providing Sanitation Blocks. And, connected to this, creating *more toilets/blocks* was the most consistent recommendation research participants would give to KENSUP officials to further improve conditions in Kibera, presumably because they have witnessed first hand the improvements (or perhaps simply because they have been involved in general).

Importantly, the most common explanation for not participating in the process was that people were simply "busy" – which is very different, say, than being skeptical of the process.

6.4 The Kiosk Survey

6.4.1 Respondents

The focus of the kiosk survey was to gather further information about the impact the road and the kiosks the City Council has built on existing businesses. It therefore targeted people working in or managing kiosks along the road. All but one of the 30 respondents were owners of the business and almost three quarters of them owned businesses in the area *before* the road was built (Fig 6.4.1). The age range of respondents was from 19 to 67, and 14 were female, 12 male and for four the gender was not recorded (Table 6.4.1). Goods sold and services provided proved to be extremely diverse, including barbershops, salons, restaurants, butcheries, an MPESA stall, and small businesses that sold everything from cosmetics, flour, hardware, sweets, scrap metals, charcoal, medicines, food stuffs, paraffin bags, milk, cake, soap, fruit, charcoal stoves, and water. 25% indicated that, in addition to their work, they looked after families. In other words, the responses in the survey are by and large from those whose work environment was transformed by the road, not by business people who have moved into the area as a result of the road (and perhaps displaced others).

Fig 6.4.1. Kiosk ownership.




Table 6.4.1 Age and Gender

	Number	Avg	Min	Max
Female	14	34	19	57
Male	12	43	28	67
Not Recorded	4	41	28	57
Grand Total		38.6	19	67

Impact

The reported impacts of the road suggest that conditions improved for businesses as a result of more clients, better access, and longer hours (due to the lights), but that there was also an effect on rents, the sense of security of tenure, and exposure to theft and vandalism. There was little reported change in access to employees or levels of competition (Fig 6.4.2). Approximately half of the research participants thought that new kiosks introduced by the City Council would not help their businesses at all, while 1/3 thought they would (Fig 6.4.3). Almost 2/3s, however, indicated that they would not be interested in renting one (Fig 6.4.4a), although it appears that those who have been in business for a short time and less likely to be negative than those who have been in business a long time (Fig 6.4.4b).

Fig 6.4.2 Impacts of the Road on Business Operators




Fig 6.4.3 Will council kiosks help business?




Fig 6.4.4a. Would you consider renting a kiosk?





Fig 6.4.4b. Respondents who had been in business for less than 10 years (U10) showed much less opposition to renting a stall than those who had been in business for over 20 years (Ov20)



Again, the measures of impact on and optimism about aspects of community life show an enormous transformation from past, to present, to expectation about the future. (Fig 6.4.5-a,b,and c.)

Fig 6.4.5A Perspective on living conditions before KENSUP began.




Fig 6.4.5B Perspective on living conditions at time of study.






Fig 6.4.5C Perspective on living conditions likely when KENSUP is finished.



If scores are assigned to the replies of Much Worse (1) to Much Better (5), and the scores are aggregated for all the parameters, a general index of how things were, are, and will be can be generated (Fig 6.4.6). This reinforces the sense of improvements that have resulted and the optimism that respondents hold.

Fig 6.4.6. Overall assessment of perception of quality of life in the community: 1=very bad, 3=ok, 5=very good.



Process

Because of the restricted focus of the kiosk survey, respondents were not asked about their engagement in the planning or implementation process.

Implications

These data again show that the K-WATSAN/KENSUP intervention has accomplished the intended main objectives with respect to overall improvement in all of the impact variables, and great optimism for continued improvement in the impact variables. This suggests a positive overall perception of K-WATSAN/KENSUP. With respect to business operations, it is clear that the road has changed the context within which business is conducted, bringing more business and benefits associated with that, but also exposing operators to concerns about tenure, rent and vandalism. This is perhaps fully expected if a business owner has previously worked in a remote segment of the community but is now on “main street”.

The fact that there are mixed feelings about the introduction of City Council kiosks (which, if continued along the road, would displace the informal sector kiosks) and that so few people expressed interest in renting one, may reflect general nervousness about change, a worry about tenure or costs, or a worry about moving from the informal sector to a more regulated business environment.

In addition to these fears, narrative responses demonstrate a key aspect of this concern or caution comes from the reality that rent is both far more expensive than the existing informal structures *and* the space is much too small in comparison. For example, 33% of respondents said that the main reason they were not interested and/or maybe interested was that fees/rent was too expensive. However, research participants who did express interest in renting from the City Council explained that a main reason was that the location, being at the beginning of the paved road, attracted many customers. One participant noted that the newly built Riara University (and its student population) demonstrated that it was a strategic place to do business with the steady incoming and outgoing population. An additional and important belief also expressed through narrative answers was the inflexibility of payment (i.e. having to pay rent at a certain time on a monthly basis) was not a realistic, and sometimes impossible, commitment to make. This, too, was confirmed both in informal conversation and through participant observation.

During the time of the fieldwork in Soweto East the City Council kiosks were vandalized and, in some cases, completely destroyed (by fire) twice. In both cases, where the kiosks were no longer standing, and thus empty land/space was left, structures were built (almost instantaneously, sometimes overnight) to run various businesses out of, including a bar. In both cases, the City Council returned to demolish *those* structures and rebuild the formal ones. In informal discussion and participant observation it is clear that this “cat and mouse” has been ongoing since the formal kiosks were first introduced. This demonstrates that a process of community consultation and agreement between residents and the City Council for this particular project was/is missing, and also the ongoing conflict about who owns and runs the land. Importantly, while the act of vandalism could be viewed as being quite violent, the impression was that it was expected and unsurprising, with residents sometimes shrugging nonchalantly at whatever the latest exchange was.

Insecurity, which was described mostly as “theft” and explained to be a result of a lack of employment opportunities, was the most common challenge articulated for this group of research participants. Poverty, connected to the latter, was the second most common and, again, explained in the context of cash and access to jobs. The most beneficial aspects of both running a business and living in Kibera was largely “the affordability of life”, the opportunities for business exchange, and the proximity to town. Finally, for this group, “improve housing” was the main advice they would give to KENSUP officials concerned with what action would most benefit the community.

6.5 Assessing the best, worst and most urgent aspects of life in the community.

6.5.1 Introduction

As outlined in the introduction, when making changes to a human-ecosystem, it is important to acknowledge attributes of communities that account for their viability, vitality and vibrancy. Understanding how these attributes emerge, are regulated, and sustained is one of the most important tasks within any community development initiative, and this is especially true of slum upgrading given the possibility of community scepticism from experiences with past projects. Because it is necessary to know how essential attributes can be replicated or maintained, the following questions were asked:

- (1) What would you say are the hardest or most worrying things about living in Kibera?
- (2) What are the best things about living in Kibera? - about your home and community?
- (3) If you could speak to the people who are planning for slum upgrading in Kibera, what would you say would bring the biggest benefits to the community?

- Respondent participation for each question were n=176, n= 171, and n=170, respectively.

6.5.2 Respondents

For each of the field surveys administered, all survey respondents were asked about the quality of life in Kibera, and what was needed for improvement, if anything. This was done to assess the best and worst aspects of life in the community according to residents and to define their greatest needs. The Road Survey was used to analyse the data for this question as it included the greatest number of participants (n=180) and was most randomized, ensuring a diverse range of opinions/experiences of a diverse group of people was captured.

6.5.3 Impacts

6.5.3.1 Positive Attributes of Kibera

To determine what attributes respondents felt were positive about Kibera, the question posed was: what are the best things about living in Kibera (– about your home and community)? Respondents were encouraged to provide up to three attributes, and field assistants were instructed to record responses as mentioned. These attributes created a rich variety of qualitative data when recorded, and were post-coded in order to distinguish overall themes. The coding-tree (Table 5.2.3.1) outlines a summary of responses associated with codes.

Table 6.5.3.1 Coding table for the most positive aspects of living in the community	
Code assigned	Summary of comments recorded.
Affordability	Includes the affordability of life in general – specifically, food, housing, labour, commodities, education, rent, infrastructure, health care (free), social interactions, and school (free). Often “life is cheap” was explicitly used.
Community	Includes “living with many people”, “the spirit of living many as one”, easy to socialize often, having good neighbours, family members being present, many languages, many different kinds of people to interact with, intermarriages with different tribes, etc. (Descriptors used: harmonious, unity, etc.)
Proximity	Includes comments about the distance from Kibera to the Central Business District (CBD) and the Industrial Area being ideal for access to work opportunities. Also includes being near to family and schools.
Simplicity	Includes comments about lifestyle, freedom, and relaxation being aspects of “the simple life”
Business	Includes shared experiences of doing business in Kibera, describing it as “easier than in other places” and that there are a wide assortment of businesses to choose from (i.e. there is both access to businesses and the

	ability to run a business). The “availability of everything” was also included.
Services	Includes NGOs, water, electricity, support groups, and the Resource Centre that was initially part of KENSUP.

According to survey respondents, the best attribute of living in Kibera is its affordability (Fig 6.5.3.1 & Table 6.5.3.1). Often summarized through the phrase “life is cheap”, the specific things survey respondents appreciated the low cost of were food, housing, labour, commodities, rent, healthcare, and school fees.


Kibera’s sense of community was second to its affordability and included “harmonious” and “accepting” qualities that drew residents closer together in “unity” and created a “spirit of living many as one”. Respondents described residents as diverse in tribe, language, and religion, and celebrated a social environment consisting of good, reliable neighbours and many family and friends nearby. The frequency of intermarriage between different tribes, interestingly, was included as a contributor to Kibera’s positive sense of community.

The “simplicity of life” and the proximity of Kibera to the core of Nairobi were the third and fourth most common positive attributes respectively. What makes life simple in the community was sometimes described as the general “freedom” or “relaxation” of the social environment, as well as the ability to access basic goods (e.g. commodities). The details of this simplicity beyond that, however, were difficult to determine because “life is simple” was the most common expression was not often followed with further explanation. In contrast, the appeal of Kibera’s proximity was uniformly explained as producing more access to employment opportunities/possibilities by having physical access to travel to the Central Business District (CBD) and Industrial Area both by foot and affordable public transportation. In other words, the short distance to the city centre was consistently expressed as a valued attribute because it could connect or create opportunities, especially for employment.

According to survey respondents, living in present-day Kibera means being surrounded by family and friends in a supportive, interesting, dynamic community that combines the ability “to afford everything” with the close proximity to opportunities (real or perceived) in the city’s CBD

and Industrial Area. The experience of cost, community, and proximity, then, are the overall benefits of living in the community of Kibera. And this, perhaps, is the foundation for a “simple life”.

Figure 6.5.3.1



When disaggregating overall results to determine independent variables that might predict responses, no obvious differences between genders exist. There is, however, an interesting apparent decline in the importance of affordability with age: younger people appear to be drawn by the low cost of living in Kibera but, as they mature, they come to appreciate other things such as simplicity, proximity, and opportunities related to business. (Note: As mentioned in the Survey Methods section, tables and graphs that outline age and gender of respondents are all based on the aggregate of all attributes mentioned, without regard to order, which is why the sample size is sometimes more than 400.)

Fig 6.5.3.2





Fig 6.5.3.3



The question was formatted to allow respondents to name “up to three” attributes, and while they were not explicitly told to rank them in order of importance, looking at the order does provide a

rating system for attributes listed. What was recorded first was, at least, what came first to mind for participants. Disaggregating results by gender and age in this respect provided no departure from overall findings save the fact that the importance of simplicity and proximity became slightly more important as people got older, and women first mentioned community more than men (24.6% versus 14.9%) while simplicity was mentioned slightly more by men than women (16% versus 10.1%).

6.5.3.2 Challenging Attributes of Kibera

To determine what attributes respondents felt were most challenging about Kibera, the question posed was: what would you say are the hardest or most worrying things about living in Kibera? As with the question about positive aspects living in the community, respondents were encouraged to provide up to three attributes, and field assistants were instructed to record responses as mentioned. For this question, responses recorded contained significantly more qualitative data, creating a much larger pool of post-coded data to analyse. The coding-tree (Table 6.5.3.2) outlines a summary of responses associated with codes.

Code assigned	Summary of comments recorded.
Insecurity	Includes the presence of thieves/theft, high crime rates, and concerns about personal safety. Often defined by a list of variables (e.g. more risks for fires and eviction). Includes feelings of insecurity during 2008 elections. (Note: only one person mentioned insecure land tenure.)
Sanitation	Includes infrastructure that maintains sanitation such as: drainage/sewage and lack of garbage collection/dumping site. Also includes general concerns about living in "a polluted environment".
Housing	Includes comments about low quality of structures (majority of people described this rather than having a "lack of housing"). Two people said "high rent" and "increase in rent" was an issue, which was included here.
Poverty	Includes "simple living", "low living standards", and any issues connected to experiencing a lack of money/financial opportunities/income (e.g. one person noted "a lack of food", which was included under Poverty). Additionally, "poor environment" was interpreted similarly.
Employment	Includes unemployment, access to jobs, lack of available work with steady income, and joblessness/unemployment.
Congestion	Includes comments about there simply being too many people (e.g. "population control needed") and the physical reality of having many people and structures in a small geographic space.

Health	Includes sickness, disease, health care, health services (e.g. clinics), and addressing malaria, specifically.
Education	Includes lack of education, lack of proper training of teachers, illiteracy, and <u>quality</u> of education, which was commented on the most (i.e. there <i>is</i> education, but it is the quality of that education that is the concern.)
Demolition/Eviction	These realities were explicitly stated and often assumed as self-explanatory. 'Displacement' or fear of being displaced due to demolition/eviction was also included.
Tribalism	Specifically/explicitly mentioned a number of times and difficult to group with other codes. It was mentioned 10 times. (5% of respondents speaking about this.)
Idleness	Explicitly noted many times. Idleness did not necessarily mean lack of employment as idleness of youth/children was often the descriptor of them "not having something to do". Includes lack of opportunities for play, training, and employment, and was often in reference to activities of children/youth specifically.
Electricity	Includes unreliable, illegal access, and unpredictable supply in general.
Fire	Includes any mention of having a fear of fire explicitly.
Corruption	Includes corruption of the administration governing/building the road, and manipulation of residents by politicians.
Water	Includes water shortage, clean supply, and accessibility.
Discrimination	Specifically/explicitly noted.
Accessibility	One person noted accessibility saying: "access to shops is difficult".
Criminalization	One person noted "police nagging...they think we're all criminals".

Overall, insecurity, sanitation, and housing were the three most common issues of living in Kibera that were most worrying/difficult (Fig 6.5.3.2.1). Examining the insecurity/security concerns more closely, research participants included many things to describe this reality, including: the presence of thieves/theft, high crime rates, concerns about personal safety, the risks associated with fires, feelings associated with the post-election violence, and land tenure. Unsurprisingly, when cross-examining results to understand what recommendations respondents would give to KENSUP in order to improve life in the community, a number of specific suggestions addressing these challenges recorded. (See the following section for further explanation.)

Living with a poor state or lack of sanitation services and infrastructure was the second most common challenge articulated. According to respondents, adequate sanitation standards are not met in the community due to inadequate or non-existent drainage and sewage systems, little to no

garbage collection, no central dumping site, and few clean and well-maintained toilets available. There were other specific concerns about living in “a polluted, dirty environment” in general while being exposed to “dirty water passing outside (or inside) houses” and “too many rats”. The result has been more exposure to and experience of various diseases not noted or named, but clearly expressed as a result of these lacking services and infrastructure.

The state of peoples’ homes was the third most common challenge faced. Respondents described housing as being “improper”, “temporary”, “impermanent” and “too small”. The relationship between renters and structure owners (i.e. landlords), too, has contributed to the vulnerability described through this temporary and impermanent reality; “there is no housing security” and “there is no possibility for expansion or self-improvement”, for example. These responses correspond to information collected during interviews and participant observation.

The other challenging attributes are worthy to note. Poverty, the fourth most common characteristic given, is much like insecurity in that it is a particularly difficult attribute to analyse. The experience of inadequate services and infrastructure for sanitation and poor housing, for example, are elements of what constitutes poverty. But low quality of education, access to health care, and unemployment, too, are defining aspects. Because of the difficulty in a singular definition (i.e. what it does and does not include), where research participants listed poverty *specifically* it was coded as such. In addition, anything listed in relation to monies, specifically, was coded as poverty (e.g. “lack of money”, “lack of savings”). Employment included both the experience of unemployment and access to good jobs. Importantly, responses demonstrated that important work is done in Kibera – in other words, there *are* jobs – but the accessibility and/or presence of good quality jobs and security of employment was clearly articulated as a difficult reality.

Various attributes were most often described as being of “low quality”, “poor”, or “cheap” which suggests that there are systems of supply, but that they are unreliable, difficult to access, and or that they do not meet a certain basic standard or quality. This is important insofar as recognizing that many systems *are* in place within the community to address challenges – it is not the case

that they are not present whatsoever – but existing strategies related to addressing insecurity, sanitation, and housing could be much better.

Fig 6.5.3.2.1




Fig 6.5.3.2.2





Fig 6.5.3.2.3



6.5.3.3 Recommendations on how to best improve/impact the community


To determine what recommendations respondents had for improving/positively impacting life in Kibera, the question posed was: if you could speak to the people who are planning for slum upgrading in Kibera, what would you say would bring the biggest benefits to the community? As with the questions regarding positive and challenging attributes, respondents were encouraged to provide up to three attributes, and field assistants were instructed to record responses as mentioned. As with the question concerning challenges, this question created a great deal of qualitative data and a much larger pool of post-coded data to analyse. The coding-tree (Table 6.5.3.3.1) outlines a summary of responses associated with codes.

Code assigned	Summary of comments recorded.
Sanitation	Includes building a dumpsite, creating effective garbage collection in the community, building more toilets (including in the new housing, where suggestion was for a toilet in each flat), constructing a proper water supply, creating better drainage, and making a “clean environment”.
Security	Includes decreasing thieves/theft, increasing police posts/police presence in general, and building fences with guards (specifically suggested for around the new housing being built).
Housing	Includes the suggestions: to provide cheap/affordable housing (even rental), to build more of what they are building now (the high rises), to construct good quality housing (large/spacious), to construct “permanent” houses, to make it possible to own the unit/house, to reduce rent (current rents are too high. One person suggested the quality of the material (stone) used for the new housing would be an important way to improve the community (i.e. it would help to prevent fires).
Healthcare	Includes clinics, services (providing malaria medication/nets), food and clinics for malnourished children, clinics specifically for pregnant women and children, and more hospitals.
Infrastructure	Includes creating footpaths, roads, play space for children, providing/creating parking, building an open market, “infrastructure” (without explanation), water tanks, supply electricity from a reliable source, electricity in general, and allowing matatus/transportation to work within the community.
Education	Includes focusing on the <i>quality</i> of education, building schools, hiring qualified teachers, building more resource centres with training opportunities, educating people on how to live without tribalism. Note: anything that mentioned tribes or religion (and how to live without them) was placed under education.
Lights	Most often lights was a request for ROAD lights, specifically, but there were some that requested lights in general (e.g. for increased business and for increased safety).
Employment	Includes creating opportunities for employment, dealing with unemployment, and getting community members to build the road as it continues through Kibera.
Business	Includes creating business opportunities (different than employment because people were speaking specifically about being able to run their own business) and business expansion.
Accountable Administration	Includes anti-corruption strategies, better administration, and eliminating discrimination and tribalism.
Youth	Includes employment, explicitly, as well as suggestions for jobs/roles/activities within KENSUP to address unemployment and

	insecurity. Although suggestions for a focus on youth was only made in connection to Employment, it is its own Code because policy recommendations often keep youth separate from other demographic groups given the ubiquitous demographic assumption that the majority of Kibera's residents are youth.
Community Engagement	Includes involvement of community and incorporating community members in development.
Donors	Includes the suggestion to bringing more donors and NGOs.

If given the opportunity to speak to the people responsible for ‘upgrading’ Kibera, respondents would recommend for them to focus on improving sanitation, security, and housing, respectively (Fig 6.5.3.3.1).

Fig 6.5.3.3.1




Closely examining what specific aspects of sanitation need to be addressed is important for three reasons: 1) 31.3% of all responses (n=464) were focused on some aspect of sanitation, a significant percentile in contrast to other recommendations, 2) the KENSUP pilot phase in Soweto East was driven primarily by the idea that sanitation would be the best “entry point” for slum upgrading based on an initial socio-economic survey conducted by Research International, which concluded that this was the most important issue to address (Research International, ND), 3) In light of the results of what attributes are most challenging in the community, it would be important to offer tangible suggestions for how these challenges might be faced. In other words, sanitation covers a number of conditions related to public health, including access to clean water,

adequate sewage disposal, and maintaining a clean environment. Given that sanitation was the second most common challenge recorded overall, what respondents suggest focusing on matters as the elements of “proper” sanitation are vast as well as subject to various definitions.

That said, the three most common suggestions for improving sanitation were to related to garbage disposal (33%), toilets (29%), and drainage (24%). Sewage (6%), water (5%), and suggestions related to the existing Sanitation Blocks (i.e. K-WATSAN) (3%) were other suggestions of focus, respectively.

Fig 6.5.3.3.1.1



The system for trash disposal in Kibera is lacking. There is “too much garbage” and it is described as “happening everywhere”, often “disposed of at random”. To address this, respondents suggested creating a central (or nearby) dumpsite for waste/garbage disposal in the community while improving garbage collection procedures via a better waste management system in general. Building more public toilets, available for use at affordable rates (ideally free), would increase the accessibility of sanitation for residents and eliminate the practice of “flying toilets”, which was only mentioned once. Creating better, “more sophisticated” or “proper” systems for effective drainage would result in a reduction of waterborne diseases in the area and, relatedly, the suggestion for addressing sewage concerns was to “construct more sewage channels to reduce health hazards”. In the context of sanitation concerns, the availability

of clean water for drinking was the main concern recorded. Respondents' suggestion was to construct a well/borehole and improving water channels/pipes to address this.

Table 6.5.3.3.1.1

CODE	Summary of elements of Sanitation to focus on for community improvement
<i>General</i>	<i>build toilets in new housing, clean-up the environment, deal with rats that are eating food meant for humans, create environmental management, provide more/better sanitation, create better conditions of environment, and improve sanitation to reduce the risk of getting sick.</i>
Garbage/Waste Disposal	build a dumpsite that is central or nearby, create better waste management system/better garbage collection procedures, and reduce the random garbage disposal everywhere; the presence of waste is too much.
Toilets	build free public toilets, build more toilets, and address "flying toilets".
Drainage	create better/proper drainage system and create more sophisticated system to reduce the rate of waterborne diseases.
Sewage	construct more/proper sewage channels to reduce health hazards.
Water	provide clean water, create piped water, construct a well/borehole, create a constant supply, and improve water channels/pipes.
Sanitation Blocks	build more sanitation blocks, and extend/create more sanitation programmes (e.g. K-WATSAN).

Generally, respondents did not elaborate substantially on the question of how to address insecurity in Kibera; they simply said creating/providing/improving security was a high priority for improving quality of life for residents. The explicit ways in which security provision could be provided, when specified, broke down into 5 categories (Fig and Table 6.5.3.3.1.2): 1) Increasing police presence by creating "police posts" would reduce vandalism in the community and create "maximum security"; 2) Addressing the incidents of theft by reducing the number of thieves would make respondents feel more secure; 3) Providing security lights alongside the road and around businesses would improve safety; 4) Building good fencing around housing, especially the new buildings, would be ideal, and; 5) Ensuring community policing practices continued would help to enhance security.

Fig 6.5.3.3.1.2




Table 6.5.3.3.1.2

CODE	Summary of elements of Security to focus on for community improvement.
General	security was often noted explicitly, explained as simply: improving security, creating higher/good security, working on security, providing security for housing and people, “security should be provided (highest priority)”
Police	construct police posts to create maximum security and to reduce vandalism (“open up posts to reduce insecurity”)
Theft	decrease theft/thieves
Lights	improve security lights/provide them
Fencing	provide/build good fencing on houses
Community policing	enhance security through community policing

Housing, the third most common recommendation, included a diverse description of needs, such as: cheap/affordable housing (including rental), continuing to develop/build more of what is being currently being constructed (i.e. high-rise residential buildings), ensuring that good quality housing is built, building more ‘permanent’ houses, and creating opportunities for home ownership. The material to build new houses should be carefully considered because “it could help to prevent fires in the community”, and the size of units should be able to accommodate larger families (e.g. “they should be spacious”). Despite the diverse descriptions of *kinds* of

housing, and especially considering affordability was the best attribute of the community, respondents made it very clear that “rent must reflect the current standards of the community”.

Fig 6.5.3.3.1.3 Specific recommendations regarding a focus on housing for community improvement




Table 6.5.3.3.1.3

CODE	Summary of elements of Housing to focus on for community improvement.
<i>General</i>	<i>to improve/upgrade housing in general (explicitly stated) and to continue building is being constructed now (the new housing), which could address unemployment, possibly, if residents had the opportunity to work construction. Also includes suggestions for "proper", "better", "good", "adequate", "high quality", "advanced", "sophisticated" housing design.</i>
Permanence	to build permanent housing.
Affordability	to ensure cheap/reduced rent; whether owning or renting, the price of housing must be based on existing community standards.
Ownership	ensure ownership of houses/units/homes by the dwellers.
Size	build houses that are spacious/big enough for people and their families, and reduce congestion, generally.
Material	use proper materials (like stone) to reduce the occurrence of fires and the extent of damage they are capable of.

When disaggregating results by gender and age, there was no departure from the order of overall results. Men recommended to focus on sanitation, security and housing slightly more than

women, who seemed to put all six of the most cited recommendations on a more equal footing. A greater percentage of people aged 35-44 suggested focusing on sanitation, but what is most notable in this regard is that recommendations for this focus increase and stay stable (rather than decline).

Though no statistical tests were completed in this regard, the degree to which people participated in aspects of KENSUP is likely to have affected what recommendations were given. For example, it was clear from participant observation that those who were active members of the sanitation blocks (K-WATSAN) were much more vocal about its successes. This optimism was present for good reason because, based on their involvement, active members could make financial contributions towards housing cooperatives set up to assist residents with payments for the new housing (once built). The way that this worked was, if you were a registered member of a Sanitation Block, the monies earned from the user fees would go directly into facility management; no persons were paid individually for the time spent monitoring the facility. If you were a member, you were expected to contribute time, and all monies collected that did *not* go into facility upkeep were collected and shared as a contribution to individual housing cooperative accounts. The affects of these sanitation blocks seemed also to create a greater sense community cohesion as well; because they provided both a needed service to residents, and because they were generating financial support for housing, they were protected in ways that also created security for people. It makes sense that, if exposed to these positive aspects and results, a suggestion to focus on addressing aspects of sanitation is most common.

Finally, there is a proportional drop overall in concern for healthcare that is greater than the proportionate increase in concern about healthcare as people get older, which would be important to examine in further studies.

Fig 6.5.3.3.2





Figure 6.5.3.3.3



6.5.3.4 Conclusions and other significant findings illuminated in the data

The overall findings about what is good in Kibera are interesting in that they are both consistent and straightforward. The foundation of what makes Kibera a good place is not that residents are creating a new resilient and innovative urban reality, which some planning literature argues (and is theoretically true), but that the cost of living is low, maintaining a robust social life is easy, and access to downtown Nairobi and the Industrial Area is available, reliable, and affordable.

Each of the recommendations recorded for improvements in the community are, likewise, logical – perhaps even obvious. The point here is not to recreate a list of needs that is already the lived-experience of residents, nor to affirm assumptions made that there *is* a list of bad attributes and needs in slums at all. (That has already been done.) The significant findings found in this data – what is necessary to illuminate – is the order in which those needs and recommendations are given because embedded in that order is a suggested course of action. Furthermore, as evident from environmental management and urban planning literature, a record of what is *good* about living in the community of Kibera is key to understanding and honouring effective mechanisms that exist in its' complex urban eco-system.

These findings confirm that aligning theory and practice more coherently and directly is necessary. Looking at the three most common worst attributes: insecurity, sanitation, and housing, the following points, in relation to KENSUP objectives and the overall results of how the road has impacted the community, the follow are the take-aways:

- Because a major positive aspect of living in Kibera has been both the affordability and community, and because insecurity is the most common concern about living there, addressing insecurity by ensuring both that its sense of community and affordability is not lost is critical.
 - Insecurity in Kibera is defined by frequent experiences of theft and crime and concerns about personal safety. The memory of post-election violence in 2007-

08, and the threat of fires given that emergency services cannot access the interior of the settlement also influences how safe people feel. To address this, people have recommended increasing the presence of police in the community, providing lights along the road, building fences around the new housing, and ensuring traditional community policing strategies are used (i.e. knowing neighbours, monitoring strangers, and, sometimes, disciplining or publically shaming people who commit crimes.) Where KENSUP has been successful is where they have used these existing community policing strategies, and where they have partnered with the Chief of police in Soweto East. The Chief's Office has played a key role in communicating various aspects of the programme and project through "barazas" (a traditional practice where information effecting the community is shared to a gathering of people) and is also a physical space where community members turn to resolve disputes or to voice concerns. In more serious cases, it is also where police are mobilized. Where KENSUP could improve, then, is by adding infrastructure to the road that would assist people during the evening (e.g. proving lights).

- Despite the "harmonious" qualities recorded of Kibera, tribalism, as termed by respondents, is a concern within the community. This issue was sometimes connected to concerns of or experiences with insecurity – for example, "war due to tribalism" or "tribalism during election time" – but it was often listed as an issue alone/in general, and not elaborated on. This is an important point to draw on in terms of safety in the community if only to point out the fact that questions remain about divisive lines that are not discussed (and remain invisible) but are used as a foundation for subversive opinions about slum upgrading in general (i.e. the argument that the government governs itself along tribal lines and runs on nepotism).
- Increasing accessibility is not recorded as a major concern for respondents (save the issue of emergency services being unable to access the interior of the

settlement). Except for one respondent in this survey, inaccessibility was not mentioned as a challenging attribute of living in Kibera. There is evidence that accessibility has increased feelings of insecurity along the road. This contrasts slightly with the opinion that the road has affected the community in only positive ways (by “opening it up”). Informal interviews and participant observation do highlight the fact that the process of both building and adjusting to the road has been a difficult transition, and the fact that it is not specifically noted within this dataset supports that. The important point is that the community does need support while adjusting to the increased accessibility (and thus increased vulnerability) by providing security lights and, at the request of the community, further policing strategies.

- Sanitation continues to be a major challenge identified by the community. A focus on addressing or improving related issues (e.g. garbage disposal, available/affordable/clean toilets, effective drainage, and clean drinking water) would bring the biggest benefits to Kibera. This, in many ways, is a positive finding for the work done by the K-WATSAN project and KENSUP at large, and supports the argument made that starting with sanitation as an entry point for slum upgrading initiatives is an effective approach (Interview, May: 2012). There is supporting evidence, through informal interviews and participant observation, that seeing the ways in which K-WATSAN is organized, specifically, and the positive outcome of services it has created (i.e. increased access to toilets, showers, and potable water) has influenced the desire for these services to expand and for this focus (on improving sanitation) to continue. K-WATSAN is seen as a self-sustained service that is owned and operated by residents in eastern Kibera and, because it is directly connected to KENSUP at large, has helped to build trust in the process that it is driving. Focusing on creating more self-sustaining services that address needs identified by the community, then, are key for future slum upgrading initiatives.

- Rather than eviction being a common concern for residents, the state of the housing was the hardest/most worrying. This contrasts with the concerns of Amnesty International (2009) and reports by various media groups (community, national, and international), as well as with challenges/concerns shared during a focus group interview (June 29, 2012). While displacement and demolition are concerns, this is likely a worry connected to experience with/knowledge of past projects that aimed to “improve” slums by eliminating them (i.e. bulldozing). The data collected from this survey demonstrates that, in terms of housing, the concerns are about affordability, size, permanence, ownership, and construction materials used. Except in rare circumstances where new residents to Soweto East were unaware of the enumeration process that took place, illegal eviction does not seem to be considered a threat in the context of the KENSUP project in Soweto East.

7 THE IMPLICATIONS: LESSONS LEARNED

7.1 Introduction

In addition to a strong emphasis on partnerships, inclusive decision-making, transparency and communication, KENSUP and K-WATSAN adopted an adaptive management strategy that involved reflection and self-assessment at significant junctures within the process. This led to a consistent effort to note and document “lessons learned” in internal documents. This section summarizes some of the key references to lessons learned as presented within the documents.

7.2 Objectives

The objectives are to consolidate the self-assessments and observations made by those who were part of the project while they were working with the project.

7.3 Methods

All of the documents collected were scanned for comments on “lessons learned”, on “problems arising” or on “procedural recommendations”. These were compiled into a running list (46 pages long) and then sorted and consolidated into four categories:

- Lessons Learned from other slum upgrading programs, but relevant to K-WATSAN and KENSUP Soweto East
- Lessons Learned and specifically mentioned in planning or management documents for K-WATSAN and KENSUP Soweto East
- Lessons Learned as reported in documents arising from K-WATSAN and KENSUP Soweto East
- Lessons Learned as reported in critiques or studies of K-WATSAN and KENSUP Soweto East .

In this report, only those contained in the final two groups are discussed.

For each category, a theme (or subject) code was assigned to each item (Table 7.1). The codes were collated and are discussed by themes below.

Table 7.1 Coding table for Lessons Learned and Best Practice references	
Coding Label	Description: Describes any “lesson learned” that deals with....
Engagement	...the importance of engaging with the communities affected and building public participation
Complexity	...the challenges of accomplishing goals that involve a process as complex as community transformation
Difficulty of physical work	...the difficulties of doing physical work or infrastructure change in a slum environment
Competing time demands	...the limits of time that citizens may have for committing to tasks required in an
Sustainability	...the challenge of ensuring that outcomes of an intervention have enduring impact
Management	...project management aspects of interventions
Communication	...communicating information within the target communities and also with partners in a project
Risks	...potential risks arising from an intervention (as opposed to those that may arise during an intervention and which are treated under themes listed above.

7.4 Lessons Learned as reported in documents arising from K-WATSAN and KENSUP Programme in Soweto East

The list of Themes and Sub-themes is presented twice below: once for clarity and simplicity (without comment) and, then, in the section following, with discussion and clarification.

- 1) Engagement is essential to get things done
 - a. Inclusion builds confidence
 - b. Seeing results builds trust
 - c. Inclusion gives voice to marginalized (e.g. tenants vs landlords)

- i. Must identify groups and include
 - 1. Women
 - 2. Youth
 - 3. Disabled
 - 4. Ethnic Diversity
 - d. Formal structure for inclusion increases engagement (SEC, FMG)
 - i. This can increase complexity because of competing interests
 - e. Success
 - i. Builds trust
 - ii. Builds optimism
 - iii. Empowers (participants learn benefits of taking an active role)
 - iv. Provides entry points for other agencies
 - v. Multiplier effect (making things self-sustaining)
 - f. Capacity building is essential to optimise level of engagement
- 2) Complexity
 - a. Is inherent in the nature of the project due to
 - i. Difficult physical and social environment
 - ii. Relocating or displacing people is common
 - b. Complexity arises from institutional linkages
 - c. Complexity arises from inclusion of workers from community
 - i. Skills may be mismatched to job needs
 - ii. Fairness, rotation may disperse rewards
 - d. Complexity from land tenure, local regs, lack of infrastructure (space issue)
 - e. Cooperation agreements therefore better than contracts to allow adaptation
- 3) Difficulty of construction due to
 - a. Lack of access,
 - b. Inclusion of local labor
 - c. Theft in environment
 - i. Ownership of project reduces crime
 - d. Slum environments often undeveloped because of geo-physical properties

- e. Inevitably difficult if work involves relocating people
- 4) Competing time demands
- 5) Sustainability
 - a. Revenue generation will keep people involved
 - i. Can be linked to project activities
 - ii. Or linked to livelihood programmes
 - b. Dependence on donors puts things at risk
- 6) Management
 - a. A adaptive approach is required based on
 - i. Monitoring processes
 - ii. Learning from others
 - b. Flexibility is required because of the complexities
 - c. Realistic expectations must be set
 - d. Information flow is essential
 - e. Engagement with government entities should be on clear terms
- 7) Communication
 - a. Political will is critical
 - b. Promotion of advocacy at community level is a vital tool in influencing national policies
 - c. Improved awareness of other urban stakeholders – (makes people realize that slums do require collective action)
 - d. Multiplier effect from success (the value of success)
 - i. KENSUF – a concrete outcome
 - ii. Donor interest increased
- 8) Risks
 - a. Of unrealistic expectations
 - b. Of failed promises



Photo 11 Personal possessions and community members ready to move, as part of the upgrading process. These are people who are the intended beneficiaries of the new structures. (Photo from UN-Habitat collection – 2009)

7.5 Discussion of Lessons Learned Themes

- 1) Engagement is essential to get things done – slum upgrading is a transformative process and without the active support of those involved, or, worse, with resistance from those involved, the prospects of success are greatly reduced.
 - a. Inclusion builds confidence – a benefit arises simply from the respect of being shown that a citizen’s participation is sought, that his/her input is important, that there are allies who will help work for change. Even if nothing further arises, these impacts can initiate a process of interest and empowerment.
 - b. Seeing results builds trust – small successes at the local level provide evidence that trust and engagement can lead to tangible results. An incremental approach is therefore a way of building trust and engagement.
 - c. Inclusion gives voice to the marginalized (e.g. tenants vs landlords) – a previously powerless or diffident group can become active and effective by having some support through capacity building. This can reduce power imbalances that have corrosive effects.
 - i. Must identify groups and include – because slum upgrading does involve community transformation, no sector of the community should be ignored. This may require seeking out representative and providing support for otherwise voiceless groups. Typically these might include
 1. Women
 2. Youth
 3. Disabled
 4. Ethnic Minorities
 - d. Formal structure for inclusion (SEC FMG best) – giving formal structure and standing can help entrench the sense of inclusion and give more focus and motivation to engagement (as illustrated by the Settlement Executive Committees and the Facilities Management Groups).
 - i. This can increase complexity because of competing interests – of course giving more formal voice to a group increases the probability that they will have opinions or preferences that may take time to formulate or

require consultation (thus slowing procedures) or be in conflict with other groups' interests (thus requiring time for compromise or mediation).

- e. Success – whether it is in seeing a physical change made in the community (such as a sanitation block) or in the level of community coordination (as in finding that a community has a voice), successes have self-reinforcing consequences. It
 - i. Builds trust – to make partnerships more effective
 - ii. Builds optimism – to allow commitments to be made
 - iii. Empowers (they must take an active role) – and therefore ensures that outcomes will reflect community wishes
 - iv. Provides entry points for other agencies – related to trust, if one intervention is successful, other ideas will be entertained more freely
 - v. Multiplier effect (making things self-sustaining) – success will entice other actors (donors or project organizers) to engage.
 - f. Capacity building is therefore essential part of engagement – engaging in democratic, decision-making, or planning forums is not easy for all, effectiveness within these forums is often related to the skills of the participant, and yet sustained engagement will come only from the reward of some success. Therefore assistance and training in some of the required skills is essential.
- 2) Complexity -- the challenges of accomplishing goals that involve a process as complex as community transformation.
- a. Complexity from the inherent nature of the project – the challenge is great and instructive success stories are few. As with other innovative, complex processes , until it has been done several times successfully, and a body of experience develops, it continues to be a challenge. Inherent complicating factors include:
 - i. Difficult physical and social environment – informal settlements are often in marginal areas which are marginal precisely because they are difficult to live in (steep, wet, prone to floods etc.); and they may have an itinerant population with diverse backgrounds and little experience in civic action.

- ii. Moving people – because space is by definition in short supply in slums, any action involving physical work will likely involve displacing some structures and therefore moving some people. In all settings, slums or affluent areas, forced eviction, expropriation, or negotiated relocation has the potential to generate resistance.
- b. Complexity from institutional linkages – slum upgrading typically involves multiple government agencies, outside actors (such as the UN and NGOs, as well as their donors) and CBOs. Each contributes something important but coordinating the input presents challenges of coordination (as well as avoiding both gaps in tasks not tended to, and duplication of tasks that fall within several agencies' mandates).
- c. Complexity from inclusion of workers from community – in the K-WATSAN/KENSUP Programme in Soweto East an important decision was taken to use local employees. This has clear benefits associated with building engagement but also adds complexity.
 - i. Skills – not all trade skills are necessarily available and even if they are, an ad hoc team of workers will not be as efficient as a team that routine does the same type of work together.
 - ii. Fairness, rotation – an effort was made to include as many workers as possible, so a rotation was required. This compounds the skill/coordination issue noted above.
- d. Complexity from land tenure, local regulations, lack of infrastructure (space issue) – if management factors that are clear and predictable in many setting (land ownership, regulations, administrative procedures) are opaque and unpredictable in a slum, experience gained elsewhere may not be applicable. Moreover, there may not be clear formal or informal institutional arrangements to provide cohesion and which can be drawn on for social information or to initiate a process.
- e. Cooperation agreements therefore better than contracts – for all the above reasons of complexity, it is difficult or dangerous to enter into formal contracts with clear

costs and deliverable. Instead, cooperation agreements allow for realistic adaptation to unforeseen, and perhaps unforeseeable, circumstances as they arise.

- 3) Difficulty of construction – slum upgrading involves changing the built environment in major or minor ways. Projects that may be routine elsewhere may be difficult in a slum, in part for reasons linked to issues raised above (the need for engagement and the complexity of the undertaking), but also...
 - a. Lack of access – it is typically difficult to move materials and equipment because of the heavy demands on all space, and the lack of roads and pathways.
 - b. Inclusion of local labor – outside labours may not feel secure, especially if there is sense that they are intruding in a community, and local labourer teams may be affected by issues discussed under Point 2.c.
 - c. Theft in environment – because access is difficult, equipment may be hard to move, security services weak, and population densities high, there is a risk of theft
 - i. Ownership of project reduces crime – the risk can be effectively countered by ensuring that local residents DO have a sense of ownership.
 - d. Slum environment marginal – as discussed under Point 2
 - e. Inevitably difficult if work means moving people – as discussed under Point 2

- 4) Competing time demands – people who work in slum upgrading agencies typically work during the “work week” (Monday to Friday during the day). This is the time that many of the residents are also occupied elsewhere and so may not be available to community processes, even if the project is clearly intended to be in their interest. As the demands of community transformation advance, there may be several committees operating or several meeting scheduled together. This imposes a burden on the participants and may mean that some important decisions are delayed or are taken without appropriate input. The “lesson” is that meetings must be scheduled to accommodate local schedules and that they should be coordinated as much as possible.

- 5) Sustainability -- the challenge of ensuring that outcomes of an intervention have enduring impact
 - a. Revenue generation will keep people involved – people in slums are poor and so activities that cost money are discriminatory, but those activities that generate revenue (like water sales or access to sanitation blocks) will promote and support involvement.
 - i. if linked to livelihood programmes – activities that do not generate revenue but that support income generation will stimulate interest.
 - b. Dependence on donors only puts things at risk – if projects cannot be shown to be at least hypothetically self-sustaining, donors may not be interested in meeting start-up costs.

- 6) Management – all projects require project management; those in slums need special attributes to accommodate the uniqueness of the conditions.
 - a. A learning approach (lessons learned) – as noted in the introduction to this section, a “lesson learned” is that management must be analytic and self-reflective, and adaptive to what is experienced.
 - i. Monitoring processes – self-reflection must be a part of the process
 - ii. Learning from others – best practices must be incorporated
 - b. Flexibility because of all the complexities – management elements (scheduling, financing, staffing and design) must be flexible enough to absorb change without threatening the project.
 - c. Realistic expectations – given the need for flexibility and adaptation, realistic goals are essential (see “Risks” below).
 - d. Information flow is essential – being open to incoming information is essential to learning from and adapting to evolving circumstances; information sharing is essential to ensuring that partners adapt in a coordinated way, and that disappointment and frustration does not arise from necessary changes.
 - e. Engagement with government entities should be on clear terms – roles and responsibilities should be clearly defined (including the responsibility for

adapting to new circumstances should the project need to adapt for any of the above reasons).

- 7) Communication – further to the point about communication in management (Point 6.d)
 - a. Political will is critical – and so part of project planning must be generating and maintaining conditions for political will.
 - b. Promotion of advocacy at community level is a vital tool in influencing national policies -- in a democracy, the voice of a community, particularly when there are many voices and a large constituency (as are the urban poor in Nairobi), must meet competing demands on a national agenda. Finding the mechanisms to ensure representation in a national agenda must be part of a slum upgrading initiative.
 - c. Improved awareness of urban stake holders – (makes people realize that slums are counterproductive) – related to political will, if people outside slums, and who share an urban environment with people who live inside them, realize that (a) there are benefits to having problems of urban solved and (b) that it is possible to do so, they will have support initiative and thereby help establish or maintain the political will to do so.
 - d. Multiplier effect from success (the value of success) – as noted above, success can have a multiplier effect, but it must be communicated to do so.
 - i. KENSUF – the Kenya Slum Upgrading Fund is cited as an example of the impacts of success.
 - ii. Donor interest – as is increased donor interest.

- 8) Risks – again, like landing on the moon, slum upgrading is uncharted territory with few records of proven and enduring success and significant attendant risks. Of course there risks of failure arising from all of the points discussed above, and risks to programs, materials and individuals arising from some of the circumstances of work, but additional important risks include risks

- a. of unrealistic expectations – that is, of community members becoming involved in a process or project with an expectation which, even if the project is successful, will not be met. This assures disappointment even in the face of success.
- b. of failed promises – although this is not alluded to specifically in the lessons learned FROM the K-WATSAN and KENSUP Soweto East projects, it is very much embedded in the planning documents: the successful engagement of a community in a process that is abandoned or that does not deliver promised outcomes is likely to negate all of the benefits of applying the “lessons learned” and make it yet harder to overcome suspicion and resistance in the future.

7.6 Discussion

Several general points emerge from the lessons learned contained in K-WATSAN project documents. It is clear that verifiable successes were achieved through K-WATSAN (Chapter 6) but that achieving those successes relied heavily on cleaving to the best practices outlined in project planning documents (Chapter 7) – most notably engaging the community and ensuring that plans and practices reflect community input. It is evident from this chapter that essence of good project management, for these circumstances, was a willingness to commit to objectives, to monitor progress, to adapt as needed, and to maintain commitment even in the face of adversity. This echoes the best practices of Adaptive Environmental Management, a management methodology which likewise recognises the challenges on dealing with complexity, uncertainty, conflict and change.

7.6.1 Settlement Executive Committee (SEC) and Facility Management Groups (FMGs)

Given the complexity, uncertainty, conflict and change of this programme, progress relies heavily on community engagement. The robustness of the specific (and official) mechanisms of engagement are therefore important to consider.

Formed to ensure “the community would be active participants in the programme,” (Kairu, 2006: 37) the Settlement Executive Committee (SEC) is perhaps the most important piece within KENSUP for a formal community engagement strategy. Comprised of 18 members, the

committee was made up of representatives from Community-Based Organizations (CBO), Non-Government Organizations (NGO), Faith-Based Organizations (FBO), structure owners, tenants/residents, youth, orphans, disabled peoples, and widows, as well members of the City Council of Nairobi (Settlement project implementation Unit –SPIU) and Local Administration (chief, district officer and the area councillor). Formed to be the “liaison arm between the community and other stakeholders in dissemination of information, coordinating activities at the community level,” SEC was the mechanism developed to communicate with, and directly address the concerns of the community (ibid); it is the first of its kind, and is what makes KENSUP stand-out, according to informal accounts.

Despite this, the date and details of the specific process/steps for the election of SEC members, including the communication to community members (before and after) was not clear and is thus difficult to assess. The official documentation and guidelines written concerning the formation of SEC, however, were collected (with permission) from the KENSUP Office. The criteria for elected members, and the guidelines for elections, meetings, and conflict resolution, for example, were found in this document titled “Terms of Reference (TOR) and Roles for the Settlement Executive Committee (SEC)” (Ministry of Lands and Housing, 2004) and are discussed in the next section.

Similar to SEC in its foundation and importance, the K-WATSAN project formed management committees that would allow the community to both participate in the process of upgrading and play a leadership role in actions taken. They did this through the organization of the Facility Management Groups (FMG), which were comprised of people using the Sanitation Blocks; anyone could participate, in other words. In addition to these groups were more formal, elected committees (by the group members) that oversee the day-to-day management affairs. Finally, there is an overall Project Management Committee (PMC) where representatives from the FMCs (selected internally) form an overall committee whose mandate is to oversee the management of all the sanitation blocks.

7.6.2 Impact

Key stakeholders in the programme – GoK employees, Maji na Ufanisi, and effected residents – specifically noted that SEC was both important and effective during the enumeration process when they worked very hard to document/map residents of Soweto East (Key Stakeholder Interviews: June 11, 19; July 3, 4 – 2012). Since its inception, however, trust in the committee members (and its institutional relevance) has dissolved in other key stakeholder groups, save the GoK, UN-Habitat, and SEC members themselves. The main cause of this distrust and, at times, articulated frustration, is that, since its inception, there had been no re-election for SEC members. Various stakeholders expressed that this was problematic and, furthermore, a hindrance for further building trust within the community (Focus Groups; Key Stakeholder Interviews: July 2012). Additionally, there is a general feeling that the committee, as it was originally set up, was now inconsequential for the actual work in upgrading the services of the community (Informal interview: January 2013).

Nowhere in the official TOR did it state that SEC would be a permanent/standing committee, however. In fact, on the contrary, it is stated clearly that “elections for SEC officials shall be after every two years” and “the term for SEC members will be four years after which another stakeholder election will be called” (Ministry of Housing, 2004). Additionally, it notes that stakeholders “can re-elect their representative or replace him/her with another” (ibid). The decision, then, to have SEC as a permanent/standing committee is unclear. A clear (or singular) explanation was not given during semi-structured interviews, and justifications given seemed to be more guesswork on the part of the research participant or key informant. It was, however, consistently noted as a challenge. Decision-makers involved vindicated that it was best to invest training and build experience with a sub-set of elected community members in order to create the needed ‘expertise’ for community consultation. Also, given the complexity of the programme, and the need for institutional knowledge to be properly documented over time (and it has taken a great deal of time), it would be best to invest in the same people who deeply understood the challenges involved in this kind of work. To articulate this idea, multiple key informants shared (June/July 2012) that SEC members would only “step down...when the job was done” (ibid). This, of course, was taken as an admirable statement of commitment to the project’s success, but

given that SEC is celebrated as the “mouthpiece” for KENSUP at both the community and Ministry level, it does demand continually renewed leadership and accountability in order to maintain trust in the process given the historical context of slum upgrading in Nairobi. Elections are an important way to achieve this, as demonstrated by the structure of the FMC’s of the Sanitation Blocks. Without this, SECs relevance may continue to disappear over time and, at worst, may become a justification for residents to assume KENSUP functions as other projects have in the past (i.e. Nyayo Highrise).

“No one holds office for that long anywhere – it’s just too long. There should be a mentorship programme built into the committee [to ensure new leadership]. It’s key! Without succession, it will be a failure. And they [the committee members and GoK] are supposed to spearhead this.”
– Key Informant

7.6.3 Way Forward / Recommendation

During the time of the research associates’ fieldwork (May-July 2012), elections for leadership positions within the Facility Management Committees (FMC) for each K-WATSAN Sanitation Block took place successfully in Kibera (Saturday, July 21, 2012). This process was clearly communicated using community channels, a *baraza* in front of the area Chief’s office, and via person-to-person exchanges with members/users of other interest groups (i.e. The Resource Centre; The Forum, and others). In addition, former/founding partners, such as UN-Habitat, and research associate (MM) were also extended an invitation to bare witness to the process. People knew and spoke openly about it taking place, before and after, reflecting a process of engagement, knowledge transference, and accountability of the K-WATSAN management structure. This stands in contrast to the information received about SEC and, as such, it would be recommended, given their similar historical foundations, context, and the residents’ knowledge, support and ownership of the K-WATSAN project, to model SEC after the FMCs and PMG to ensure it is both relevant and effective.

Lessons based on K-WATSAN and KENSUP will be valuable for replicating the successes accomplished so far and for scaling-up. These “lessons learned” discussed above are

consolidated from project documents, and so, clearly, were recognized, documented, and available for management decisions as the project evolved. The next chapter draws on surveys, interviews and field observations to address additional “lessons” that were not explicitly listed in project documents, or which derive from or elaborate on the specific lessons documented above.



Photo 12 Unloading at the decanting site. This is the temporary residence for those who are to be relocated. (Photo from UN-Habitat collection – 2009)

8 CONCLUSIONS – PROMISE AND PERIL

8.1 Adaptive Management

As noted in the introduction, efforts to improve the lives and living conditions of the urban poor in general and efforts to upgrade slums in particular are similar to other environmental challenges in being characterized by change, complexity, uncertainty and conflict. “Adaptive Environmental Management” is a recognized best practice that is based on the need to modify management in response to evidence from ongoing monitoring. Given the dynamism and the complexity of the systems involved, the reality of scientific uncertainty about outcomes, and the propensity for opposing stakeholder views and positions, it is unrealistic to assume a plan generated in advance will be successful if followed unremittingly. On the other hand, chances of success are increased if there is a clear vision of desired outcomes, a willingness to monitor progress and learn from data received, and a willingness and ability to adjust management activities in progress.

The review of documents associated with K-WATSAN and KENSUP in Soweto East support this. The close attention to monitoring and self-reflection evident in the documents, and the carefully considered list of “lessons learned” expressed in the documents shows not only a wealth of practical learning and a generous willingness to communicate important experiences, but it also says something about the corporate philosophy of the agencies involved and the nature and commitment of the individuals who work within them. This, too, is one of the important lessons learned from our study of K-WATSAN and KENSUP in Soweto East: agencies and individuals committed to adaptive management, based on active monitoring of ongoing events and on a willingness to change in response to circumstances, will be able to engage with community members to make significant change.

This section concludes the report with comments on overarching observations that identify best practices and “lessons learned” that helped define what best practices are. The section also addresses the challenges associated with “scaling up” – because only the most robust and effective practices will justify the investment, commitment and risk associated with larger scale undertakings.

The comment on best practices come in part from the distillation of lessons learned in the previous section, but also from the other facets of the study – which include the document reviews, interviews, focus groups, surveys, and many hours spent with people involved in and affected by K-WATSAN and the KENSUP Programme in Soweto East, from its inception to the present. Some of the comments are implicit or explicit in the survey results or the programme documents. Those that were explicitly evident in the material in Chapter 7 are not repeated here.

8.2 Further observations on lessons learned from K-WATSAN

1. The value of practical work as a means of developing policy: the progress that has been made in Soweto East to date suggests that many of the strategies and interventions worked very well. But the long lists of delays, adjustments -- and the self-reflection that generated the lesson learned documents -- indicate that there had to be adaptation to circumstances encountered during the process – such as extending time for outreach activities, allowing for legal challenges or delays from lack of institutional coordination, adjusting to design or execution surprises for engineering work ensuring accountability through election processes, and managing the impact that crises such as the post-election violence might have. This practical experience and the success that it has achieved should be used to shape future interventions to be incremental, reflective and adaptable.
2. The value of water and sanitation services as an entry point to engage a skeptical or suspicious community: Given the record of slum interventions, suspicion may be high and resistance great when citizens are asked to trust, commit to or invest time in a major project. However, where basic human needs are not met, small scale interventions to address immediate needs can accomplish two things: one being to improve some of the worst elements within a community, and the other being to begin to build trust and confidence. In addition, this approach can help to create the organizational structure for community engagement that could support further interventions.
3. The value of water and sanitation services as a cost-effective way of improving many lives quickly: As noted in the introduction, there is an overarching concern about

society's, or any government's, willingness or ability to invest sums adequate to address all shelter problems of the urban poor. Moreover, there are concerns about the sustainability of projects based on providing good shelter at rates that the urban poor can afford. If the market value of shelter is significantly higher than the planned rent, designated beneficiaries may prefer to capture that value difference and live at a lower cost in shelter of lower quality. For these reasons, a judgement must be made about the relative merits of investing available capital in high quality shelter for a small number of people at a high per capita cost, or to provide basic service increase (water, sewage, lighting, access, security, security of tenure, employment and capacity building) to larger number at a lower per capita cost. The comments from the surveys about the best, worst and most needed aspects of living in slums suggest that the second strategy may deliver the greatest benefit. (Although, of course, it is recognized that this solution does not satisfy some of the other objectives of slum clearance or slum upgrading AND that it has an ethical dimension that requires acknowledging a limit to the willingness to invest, despite the evidence that the need for investment is great).

4. The value of a multifaceted approach to project management. The multiple strands of the K-WATSAN project, and the fact that the K-WATSAN project was so central to the KENSUP Programme in Soweto East, demonstrated the merit of a project that addressed several complimentary goals at the same time, or a single goal through complimentary initiatives (from water and sanitation to non-motorized transport and a community resource center). These initiatives had synergistic effects: it is unlikely that any would have progressed as well without the others, or that the final benefit of the individual initiatives would have been as great. Most obviously, providing access through a road facilitates all other developments.
5. The value of formal engagement through entities such as the Settlement Executive Committee: It is clear that community engagement is important. In some cases this can be informal, but providing a formal, structured, institutional arrangement to give voice to a community – as the SEC in Soweto East has done – and treating that entity as a full and

important partner, will help ensure consistent, sustainable and effective links with the community. To maintain the effectiveness of the liaison body, it may be that some term limits or requirement for periodic election should be considered, although, clearly, this would depend on the intended duration of the project, the skill-sets required for the designated tasks, and linkage of the body to other recognised decision-making structures within a community. (For example, if a body team is mandated and supported by a body that holds legitimate power itself, member of the liaison body could be considered as tasked representatives).

6. Volunteerism may impose unfair burdens on participants and therefore lead to sub-optimal intervention outcomes: Community members may have a very strong interest in participating in a development processes, but may be limited by time, ability, or other commitments. Moreover, as a project begins to demand more time, or is protracted over a longer period, the ability of volunteers to maintain effective engagement may be reduced. If this is recognized, compensation or incentives (such as the work rotation used by Maji na Ufanisi) may help.
7. Equitable distribution of benefits: In a community impacted by poverty and limited resources, having visible benefits or opportunities (not necessarily monetary) go to some groups of volunteers or committee members may limit the willingness or eagerness of others to volunteer or participate, especially if there are few or no opportunities to vie for a position in the group or on the committee. The lack of access to a benefit that a neighbor is getting may seem to be a penalty, unless it is very clear that the benefits reward special duty, and that, at least hypothetically, that duty could be taken up by others.
8. The dangers of a non-transparent or non-democratic group serving as the link between project proponents and the community: If a formal and mandated liaison body cannot be maintained, and active volunteers cannot continue to be engaged, a vacuum could open that would attract individuals who would purport to speak for the community, but fail to

do so. This could build frustration and resentment, which will inevitably causes the intervention to suffer.

9. The importance of an inclusive and respectful approach to public engagement: this is a somewhat nebulous parameter, but from all experience in public participation it is clear that a perfunctory, superficial or condescending approach will not have desired effects. Sincere outreach is time consuming and may open discussions that are difficult to resolve. Nonetheless, it is can be effective, as shown by the successes reported in the surveys.
10. The value of continuity in relationships of trust: relationships of trust take some time to develop and become personal. Continuity of contact, and/or a thorough process for introducing new members or member-replacements, will allow the benefits of personal trust to persist and to facilitate the development of new relationships of trust. The enduring contacts amongst those we consulted in field were clearly important to the successes that were achieved.
11. Personalities matter: Closely related to the above – the personalities, interest and commitment of people forming the relationships is important. The patient and empathetic approach required for working effectively in a partnership does not come easily or naturally to all people, and may seem frustrating or inefficient to some. What appears obviously to be the most efficient or effective path to a goal, or what appears obviously to be the best, or even the only acceptable, solution may not be achievable if progress is hampered by mistrust or hostility. The individuals we have met in the course of conducting this study have been remarkable, and their personalities, interest and commitment are no doubt a large factor in the overall programme success.
12. Win/win solutions may be fantasy - understanding that there may always be disaffected: Even when an intervention will benefit a majority, there may be those who are negatively affected by that very fact. Informal settlements have attributes that work to the advantage

of some people, whether it is as simple as someone who has benefited from selling water at an inflated price to a captive market, or as distressing as criminals wanting refuge from law enforcement. Those who fear being negatively affected will resist change and may orchestrate resistance on other grounds. Given the scope and scale of slum upgrading interventions, resistance within sectors of the community is almost inevitable. Concessions to those who profit from unacceptable conditions cannot be used to win their support, so winning the “court of public opinion”, or of community opinion, may be the only answer. This underscores the importance of good community liaison, but also points to the following point.

13. “Controlling the narrative” and dealing with media and public perception: for the reasons outlined above, good community relations and general public understanding and support is important. However, given the reality that some resistance is inevitable, and also that slum upgrading has a record that may incite outside critics, it is important to treat public perception of the intervention as an integral part of the intervention and a part that requires due (?) attention in project management. The cost of damage caused by a like “Good Fortune”, for example – film that portrayed the entirety of KENSUP in a simplistic and negative light – is diffuse. In an environment where free press and open expression are valued, the possibility that distorted images may be released cannot be controlled, but should be anticipated and, where appropriate, challenged, contradicted or balanced with accurate messages.

14. The overall slum upgrading paradox: There is no panacea for the living conditions of urban poor, and clear record of interventions that have had the desired outcome and which could universally applied – at least with prevailing financial constraints – does not exist. It is defeatist to say that society would have to change completely before it would be feasible to subsidise housing for all who need it, and to the level they require it. This means that even when the questions of best practices have been addressed, there will remain the challenge of shifting the threshold of action. It may be that more net benefit would arise from changing public demand for, and political will for, slum upgrading than

in investing in refined practices. However, for maximising the benefit that can be achieved with a fixed budget, it is certain the best practices must be identified, disseminated and applied.

15. Scaling up: Based on the above, scaling up will not require different techniques but rather the wider replication of the locally-attuned, integrative, and responsive adaptive management techniques discussed above. That said, a large part of the methodology applied in K-WATSAN and the KENSUP Programme in Soweto East has involved overcoming distrust and winning community support. A legacy of good examples, of successful transformations of communities in a way that enhances citizens' quality of life and is sustainable – and does not displace or disempower them – will streamline that part of the process. Already in Kibera, residents of adjacent villages are inviting the expansion of K-WATSAN and KENSUP work.

As the data in this report show, survey respondents are overwhelmingly positive about the impacts K-WATSAN and KENSUP in Soweto East projects have had to date. This view must be taken to reflect a fairly widespread attitude within the community, which means that the K-WATSAN and the KENSUP Programme in Soweto East has been successful so far in meeting its targets. It is important to note, however, that the overall success combined with an overall level of optimism within the community may create the possibility that disappointment will be great if expectations are not met. It may be that expectations are unrealistically high or inconsistent throughout the community -- so no single outcome would meet all expectations – but the project's success means the volatility precipitated by a later shift of attitude would be unfortunate, at best or, at worst, seriously damaging to the prospects for future community-based slum upgrading.

The record of success and the record of the experience of K-WATSAN has value for other actors in the field. The report concludes with some key points relevant to various stakeholders.



Photo 13 The Nyayo Highrise Project: adjacent high-rises that involved displacing Kibera residents, but did not lead to providing new housing for them (hence, the legacy of suspicion).

8.3 Further observations on implications K-WATSAN and the KENSUP Programme in Soweto East

The experience of K-WATSAN and KENSUP in Soweto East has particular pertinence to different stakeholders. This section considers the implications and list recommendation based on the K-WATSAN and KENSUP experience in Soweto East.

For Policy:

- Governments nationally and internationally must continue to support research on, and programs attempting to address, the challenges of increased urban poverty and high density, poorly serviced, informal settlements. This is partly a question of human rights, but also of economic and social sustainability.
- Programs must be adequately funded and coordinated across agencies to draw of the best available expertise, but also to ensure coordination of initiatives.
- Programs must allow for flexibility to meet the “best practices” of adaptive management.
- Programs must be realistic. Given what we have called the “social commitment paradox”, it is clear that resources will not soon be adequate to eliminate problems, and so judicious choices must be made to deliver the maximum good to the maximum number.
- In those choices, the positive aspects of low cost informal settlements should be recognized. As per the Hippocratic Oath: first do no harm.

Donors:

- Donor governments should note the policy conditions outlined above.
- Urbanization trends should be seen at an appropriate scale relative to other major issues of global concern, such as climate change, and the commitment should be commensurate with the imminence of the threats, the degree of injury arising and the practical tools available for redressing the issue. Healthy communities are essential elements of sustainable development.
- Programs to improve the lives of slum-dwellers should, to the extent possible, focus on the needs of the community members rather than on cosmetic or city management issues.

- Funded programs should allow both for adaptive change in the course of managing projects, but also for the possibility that projects will not always be successful, and when they are, it may not be on the timelines proposed.
- Coordination amongst agencies is essential, but the lack of a consensus on an action plan should not be used to delay or stop innovative action.

Implementing Agencies

- These agencies are on the front lines and it is from them that the signals regarding the need for adaptive adjustments will come. The responsibility to monitor and report on obstacles or opportunities must be part of management, and management structures must involve regular review and allow for strategic and tactical adjustments.
- Engagement with the community is essential, but the reality the consensus may not always be reachable, that even changes that bring great benefit to many may bring some disbenefit to some – who may protest and obstruct.
- Mechanisms for public participation should be “fair and competent”, that is, they should deliver genuine opportunities for meaningful engagement (fair) but also capable of reaching informed, transparent, supportable decisions in a timely way (competent).
- Personalities do matter, and persons who are working in communities should not only be trained professionals, but they must, to the extent possible, also be committed and empathetic individuals who will be guided by the prerequisites for overall success, not necessarily by frustrations with the complexity of the changing, complex, Uncertain, potentially conflictual environment they are working in.

Partners in the community (NGOs, CBOs and FBOs)

- Organised groups working in the community can be influential, and their interventions may either support or impede any community development initiative. In all cases, it is important to assess the capacity of groups already embedded in the community. If there missions are compatible, synergies may be identified; if the groups are opposed to new initiatives, communicating with them may help reduce conflict or, at least, identify potential barriers.

- Coordinating action on the community's top priorities, and using all allies within the community, will help assure project success. Implementing agencies and donors alike will be supportive of a single, clear and coherent program, and cohesion around priority goals will increase the chances of a self-reinforcing cycle of successes.

Community members.

- Basic human rights entitle all people to live decently. There is an obligation of society to help. Though the problem of competing interests vying for limited resources is a reality, and solutions will not come easily, there is reason to expect that outside partners will work conscientiously to improve living conditions within slums.
- That does not mean that all projects or programs are well-intentioned or competently structured. Community members must satisfy themselves of programme interventions.
- If a programme reflects a community goal, is seen as feasible, and has reliable outside partners, members of the community should coordinate to support timely action and should attempt to generate agreements within the community so that unnecessary delays are avoided.
- Success breeds success – small accomplishments will help motivate the community, build solidarity within the community, and encourage outside partners and donors.

Outside commentators – activists, academics and media.

- As with environmental management characterised by change, complexity, uncertainty and conflict, there are always good stories to be told of failures, compromises, confusion, and resistance. It is a professional obligation to seek and report truth but that is often opaque, and what can be seen of it does not necessarily coincide with ideals. Note Bismark's sausages ("laws, like sausages, cease to inspire respect in proportion as we know how they are made"). Urban poor are entitled to benefit from conditions that can improve their lives. People working to achieve that do have perfect solutions, particularly given limited resources. Becoming an impediment to whatever progress can be made may have real consequences for the lives of real people.

8.4 A synthesis

The report began with reference to adaptive environmental management and to two overarching issues, one dealing with the human ecology of informal settlements, the other with paradox of social commitment.

There are not proven solutions to problems associated with slums. Innovation is required and so active adaptation to evolving circumstances is essential. The guiding criteria should recognize the viability, vitality and vibrancy that can be found in some informal settlements and focus on the mission of improving lives. KENSUP appears to have a mechanism that will allow displace residents to occupy new formal-sector housing. Time will determine the answers to the questions of who will eventually live there and how the lives of the original community members will have changed.

Given the current level of social commitment it appears unlikely that funds will be found in the foreseeable future to provide adequate formal shelter for ALL who cannot or choose not to pay the costs of the lowest cost existing formal housing. This may mean that the only immediate solution is to find synergies within the informal sector that allow the strengths of existing communities to be supplemented with outside assistance that provides material improvements. K-WATAN has done that. The long NHC quote that opened Section 1.3 suggest that slum upgrading only assures “permanent slums”. If permanent slums provide adequate housing and allow community members to meet basic needs and live with dignity, then perhaps that is not an unsuccessful interim solution.

KENSUP and K-WATSAN have targeted the basic requests of the community as articulated in the PUA of a decade ago. They have improved lives and motivated and empowered the community, recognizing that for many living within the community, Soweto East is indeed, home, with all that that implies. They have earned trust and built expectations by having worked successfully with the community..

The final outcome of the KENSUP programme in Soweto East depends entirely on the eventual answer to the question of whether lives of the original community members will have been improved, and whether the redevelopment is financially sustainable and replicable. If the answers to both questions are positive, replicating the success and scaling-up will require taking note of the locally-based, adaptive strategies that won success here, and understanding the financial mechanism that assured financial sustainability.

But until that answer is available, and even if that answer is eventually negative, there are invaluable lessons of success in the implementation of the project to date. The adaptive approach to working with the community to meet the basic goals for the community has been successful and is replicable. Given the dynamic and complex nature of informal settlements, the scientific uncertainty about the impacts of interventions, and the potential for conflicts in multi-stakeholder groups, adaptive management must necessarily be locally based, community based. This does not preclude scaling up: the record of success will foster commitment from all stakeholders from community members to donor and governments and the incorporation of best practices from lessons learned will increase efficiencies. Scaling-up, then, will not likely be best achieved by enlarging a standardized monolithic program, but rather by supporting an increased number of somewhat autonomous, locally adapted, iterations of an effective system. A rabbit can be “scaled up” to an elephant or to 10,000 rabbits. A distributed network of somewhat autonomous, locally adapted, community-based systems has (very successfully) created the global network of rapidly growing informal settlements -- with all their strengths and weaknesses. The evidence from this study is that a similar distributed network – stressing local adaptivity and community engagement – will be required to improve the lives of those millions living in slums. But this network will require strong institutional partnerships. The KENSUP Programme in Soweto East, and K-WATSAN initiative, have shown how this process can begin.



Photo 14 The new structures will provide more durable accommodation and better access to service. The question is to whom, and with what relation to the community? There is some fear that it might not be for the original inhabitants, and that it may be isolated from the community as a whole.

Appendix 1: Terms of Reference for Settlement Executive Committees

THE CRITERIA FOR ELECTION OF SEC MEMBERS

- a) The candidate: must have been residing and/or working in the settlement for at least two years,
- b) Must have been an active member of one of the organizations or social groupings within the settlement,
- c) Must have a record of ability to mobilize community members and good public relations within the settlement,
- d) Must have been interested and have participated in community development projects or work within the settlement and
- e) Should preferably be able to speak both Kiswahili and English.

GUIDELINES FOR ELECTIONS:

- a) Three positions must be reserved for representatives of disadvantaged groups,
- b) Every stakeholder will be gender sensitive during representative elections.
- c) The district officer, Area Councilor and Area Chief will be co-opted as members
- d) Representation will be as per the ratio of members in that particular stakeholder category. Possible categories are: the Structure Owners, Tenants, Widows, Orphans, Disabled, Faith Based Organizations, Community Based Organisations; Area Councillors and any other organization that might be in that particular area.

SEC OFFICIALS

- a) SEC members will elect their Chariman, Vice Chairman and the Assistant Secretary. However, the Secretary will come from SPIU team.

- b) Elections for SEC officials shall be after every two years; and those officials will be eligible for re-elections during the subsequent elections. Notice for such a meeting shall be given at least 21 days before the date for election.
- c) The term for SEC members will be four years after which another stakeholder elections will be called. The stakeholders can re-elect their representative or replace him/her with another representative.
- d) Any vacancy of the SEC officials caused by death or resignation shall be filled by any of the SEC members and the official shall serve *only* the remaining period before elections for new SEC officials are held as per (b) or (c) above. Thereafter the relevant stakeholder category will be notified to elect a replacement to SEC.
- e) Vacancies arising from the SEC officials being removed from the office for any reason shall be filled in the same manner as indicated in (d) above.

SEC MEETINGS

- a) SEC will meet once monthly at the site office, but should need arise a special meeting will be convened
- b) The Chairman, or in his absence, the Vice-Chairman, shall chair all SEC meetings.
- c) Quorum for any meeting shall be 2/3 of the SEC members.
- d) Decision making will be by simple majority voting of the members present in a meeting.
- e) Ex-officio members will not be eligible to vote.
- f) The Secretary will ensure that the proceedings of the meetings are minuted for the record purposes.
- g) Confirmed copy of the minutes shall be distributed to the Director of Housing; the director, HDD (NCC) and the Programme Coordinator, Programme Secretariat.
- h) Any SEC member who fails to attend three consecutive meetings without apology or valid reason shall be considered and or/recommended for replacement by the relevant stakeholder group.

ROLE OF SEC IN THE PROGRAMME CYCLE

SEC members will...

- a) Create awareness within the community on various components and activities of the Slum Upgrading Programme;
- b) Assist JPPT in the enumeration process by working in partnership with appropriate organisations in the identification and documentation of residents of settlement area,
- c) Ensure concerns and issues raised by the community members are conveyed to the Programme Secretariat/JPPT,
- d) Be part of the dissemination team at the community level, assisting in selecting research assistant/enumerators from the community,
- e) Assist in verifying and confirming the various data collected during research team meetings,
- f) Get views from the community on house design options,
- g) Get views from community members on construction at the decanting site and subsequent relocation exercise,
- h) Actively participate in the relocation exercise to the decanting sit by assisting the JPPT/Programme Secretariat/SPIU,
- i) Assist the community members in settling into their new environment by raising public awareness and education on their rights to basic social amenities and of maintaining good neighbourliness.

*For any document from SEC to be considered valid, it will have to be signed by the SEC officials (i.e. Chairman, Secretary or both).

THE ROLE OF SEC DURING PREPARATORY PHASE

They will participate in the identification of areas of interest for their capacity building. They will:

- a) Participate in the development of key messages to be incorporated into the Information, Education and Communication (IEC) materials,
- b) Document and report key views the community might have on tenure systems to be adopted,
- c) Document and update information on key case studies with regards to HIV/AIDS impacts and propose activities by KENSUP,
- d) Actively participate in the dissemination of information on the process at the community level to the media through reports to the secretariat. They will also be responsible for disseminating information from stakeholders and partners to the community through focus group discussions,
- e) Identify/establish and maintain community-based communication networks to ensure that reliable information flows to the community,
- f) Continuously maintain an update of information from the community on the upgrading process through fortnightly meetings at the site office,
- g) Provide reports to the programme secretariat on community-based issues in regards to the programme process,
- h) Inform the community members of decisions made by the JPPT/Programme Secretariat
- i) Inform the community members of any planned visits to their area by any visitor (i.e. Minister, etc.)

THE ROLE OF SEC DURING IMPLEMENTATION PHASE

The SEC members will...

- a) Assist in identifying the unskilled construction labour force from the community members,
- b) Update the community members on the construction progress,

- c) When necessary, accompany the technical staff and other visitors during their inspection visits

THE ROLE OF SEC DURING MONITORING AND EVALUATION

- a) JPPT and SEC will jointly develop appropriate community based tools for monitoring and evaluation,
- b) SEC will actively participate in the monitoring and evaluation of the programme, as appropriate, including after each specified activity/phase for feedback and improvement of future phases.

THE ROLE OF SEC DURING REPLICATION

Where necessary, SEC will participate in peer exchange visits to share lessons learned and best practices in slum upgrading.

Nominations/elections for the Soweto East SEC members were conducted during each stakeholder/organization meetings held in Soweto East village on different dates between 26th May, 2004, and 10th July, 2004. Below is the breakdown of the stakeholders' representation:

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